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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Developed countries around the world are experiencing crises with regards to the 
design of retirement systems. A veritable panoply of reasons have been put forth as to 
why this is the case; most, however, agree that the changing age structure of the world 
population is a chief component. However, governments that have already enacted 
reforms have achieved widely varying results. It is the goal of this paper to explore the 
reasons behind such variation in both speed and level of retrenchment. This topic 
provides an interesting discussion for several reasons, but a key factor is an observed 
dissonance between pressures and outcomes in two specific cases: the United Kingdom 
and the Federal Republic of Germany. The central questions of this essay are thus: why 
was the United Kingdom able to effectively preclude pension funding problems through a 
reform passed in an environment of low pressure to reform? Alternatively, why does 
Germany face such dire straits regarding its pension system when it has been facing high 
pressure for decades? If outcomes were shaped solely by pressures to reform, it seems the 
situations of these two countries would be swapped. It turns out that the answer to these 
questions provide wide-ranging insights into the factors necessary for successful pension 
retrenchment. Furthermore, examination of these necessary factors leads one to the 
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conclusion that in general, democracies have trouble with pension reform. Since the 
difficulties inherent to pension reform can be seen as the difficulties of imposing losses 
on wide swaths of the population, this issue serves to highlight near-universal problems 
intrinsic to many areas of social policy. The nature of democracy engenders these 
quandaries, and also necessitates a particular strategy in order to deal with them: low-
visibility retrenchment.  
 
 
WHY IS RETRENCHMENT AN ISSUE?  
 
Why are nations being confronted almost universally with the imperative to 
retrench? The answer turns out to be more complex than the fact that populations are 
getting older. Furthermore, we must understand the catalyzing factors, because to the 
extent that they vary from country to country, outcomes may vary as well. 
Understandably, the specific pressures that a government faces to retrench have 
ramifications for the measures it undertakes. It is critical to note that while these 
pressures retain some explanatory power, system-level pressures constrain and pervert 
outcomes. One may conceive of this process as analogous to Kenneth Waltz’s theory of 
international relations, where system-level pressures intervene between actors’ intentions 
and outcomes.1  
 Many forces have been posited to be responsible for the global trend towards 
retrenchment, and due to their global nature they are relevant to the cases studied herein. 
One such force is globalization, which has both political and economic implications. 
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First, it “undermines the capacity of nation-states to control their own affairs.”2 As 
financial markets become more and more integrated, the level of autonomy regarding 
macroeconomic policy becomes diminished.3 The vastly increased mobility of capital 
exerts downward pressure on corporate tax revenues, as countries ‘race to the bottom.’4 
This in turn places stress on general budgets. Similarly, the mobility of production factors 
greatly increases pressure on governments to reduce contributions and thus benefits: if 
production of cars in the United States is too expensive due to the imposition of costs by 
welfare provision, producers will shift production to other countries.5 Therefore, 
politicians face pressure from corporations and labor to lower levels of provision and thus 
cost. Lesser-developed countries, with newly discovered production capabilities, present 
a threat that cannot be ignored. In this context, generous pension programs may seem like 
luxuries that can no longer be afforded.6 Finally, the competition that newly 
industrialized countries present causes firms to shift away from older, more expensive 
labor towards younger workers; older workers may then simply retire rather than 
searching for employment. A decline in the average retirement age is sure to place 
pressure on pension systems.   
 Pierson argues that “it seems likely that this stress is primarily related to a series 
of post-industrial changes occurring within advanced industrial democracies themselves,” 
rather than this globalization thesis.7 One of these changes is slower general economic 
growth as a result of expansion of service sector employment.8 He contends that if “3 to 4 
per cent economic growth had continued over the past quarter-century, many of our 
current problems would never have materialized.”9 Another change he mentions is 
“increasing inflexibility and intense fiscal pressure, including tendencies towards deficit 
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spending.”10 Austerity has become a global imperative, attendant to the rise of the 
Washington Consensus. The explosion of welfare provision across the globe produced a 
significant loss of policy flexibility as larger portions of GDP were committed to 
programs.11 Swank adds that “the widespread ascendance of neoliberal macroeconomic 
ideas, which call for roll-backs in government intervention and highlight market 
distortions of social welfare programs and redistributive taxation” has explanatory power 
regarding the spread of retrenchment.12 
 These factors pushing governments all over the world towards retrenchment 
serves as the general background against which the U.K. and Germany confront their 
specific problems. As such, regardless of the specific situation that each country faces at 
present, we should expect to see a continuing trend of retrenchment. The exact shape this 
retrenchment will take depends on the precise effects that policy-makers in each country 
are subject to. However, as we will see, expected outcomes do not match the pressures in 
these countries.  
Often the design of social insurance programs is questioned in terms of efficiency, 
fairness, adequacy, and of course the problem of funding. Given the volume of literature 
and the level of discussion by scholars on the topic, it seems on the surface to be almost 
incomprehensible as to why this should be the case. There seems to be a disconnect 
between the wisdom about the subject and the actual policy that is enacted. The reality, of 
course, is the core of my analysis: social insurance programs provide unique and complex 
challenges to policy-makers, and these challenges usually regard politics rather than 
technical problems. In short, these challenges create dissonance between technically 
efficient ideas and actual policies.   
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WHY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND GERMANY?  
 
These two countries are similarly prototypical in the design of their retirement 
systems, so much so that the Beveridgean and Bismarckian systems are used as 
benchmarks in the study of pensions. Both countries are western European democracies 
with large populations and economies. Furthermore, both have political systems well 
suited to analysis: the Westminster model is archetypical, while the federalist nature of 
Germany raises many interesting questions about policy-making. Both countries have 
undergone recent pension retrenchment and adjustment. Finally, these countries find 
themselves in very different positions with respects to the level of pension provision and 
funding despite exposure to similar demographic dilemmas.  
These two countries are also interesting to compare because they have very 
different political traditions. This is partially the result of their different institutions and 
ideologies, as we will discover. The United Kingdom has historically been majoritarian in 
nature, while Germany can be characterized as largely corporatist. In other words, the 
United Kingdom has a high power concentration, and policy largely reflects the 
government’s priorities.13 On the other hand, Germany employs a system of interest 
intermediation in which groups with conflicting interests are included in policymaking.14 
It has strong, well-integrated labor movements and employers’ associations, standard 
procedures for concertation, and is overall much more consensual.15 These different 
political traditions, and their historical determining factors, are critical to comprehension 
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of the efficacy of policy-making in either country. Furthermore, the fact that these 
traditions are almost diametrically opposed allows for further definition of these cases as 
archetypal and thus useful for extrapolation.  
Essentially, this distinction of tradition addresses the issue of dealing with 
external interests. Pension policy is an area where the successful management of such 
interests is crucial: the elderly compose a large, politically active interest group.16 
Moreover, employers and unions are also involved in the issue of social insurance, and 
they compose a well-financed and thus powerful group as well. Of course, not only does 
tradition speak to the issue of how governments deal with external interests, but it also 
defines the importance of such management. The successes and failures of interest 
management may thus be of varying importance to policy outcomes. As such, it is 
certainly an aspect worthy of consideration, and the location of the two countries at 
opposite poles of tradition amplifies the value of this consideration. 
With a general background of retrenchment across the globe in place, we should 
expect, ceteris paribus, similar results across nations. Despite the fact that these countries 
vary in so many ways in terms of institutions and traditions, they are informative as to the 
factors necessary for successful retrenchment. This is because they serve as examples on 
opposite ends of the democratic spectrum: the U.K. as strong majoritarian, and Germany 
as weak consensual. Regardless of these differences, however, we should expect that 
countries facing greater pressures would reform before countries facing little pressure, as 
this seems only logical. Let us examine budgetary stress and demographic pressure, and 
then the situation each country faces.  
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Budgetary pressure has been mentioned as a factor affecting policy outcomes. 
How much influence can we expect it to have? A basic understanding would lead one to 
the conclusion that budgetary pressure is directly related to the probability of successful 
retrenchment. This pressure can be conceptualized in two ways – general budget 
imbalances or the particular burden of pension spending.17 However, reforms are not 
always undertaken in times of high budgetary pressure. This is particularly striking in the 
British example, where the 1986 reform “came after budget problems were under 
control.”18 Furthermore, following the 1986 reform, which essentially inhibited any 
future budgetary pressure, all retrenchment was undertaken in this environment of low 
budgetary pressure. Moreover, any retrenchment in the U.K. takes place in a country 
where pension expenditure as a portion of spending is among the lowest in the OECD.19 
On the other hand, in Germany, reform even approaching the scale of the 1986 
SSA in Britain did not take place until 2001, despite the fact that Germany has 
consistently faced greater budgetary stress. It appears that demographic pressures, which 
are directly tied to budgetary pressures, “do not directly produce corresponding social 
policy reform.”20  Kitschelt supports this contention by pointing out that if this were a 
highly determinative criterion, then Germany would have long ago engaged in a vigorous 
effort to solve its problems, while the U.K. would have undertaken the least effort to 
reshape their pension programs.21 
How can we account for this dissonance between stresses, efforts, and outcomes?  
First, we must examine in greater detail the two cases, which involves the situations the 
countries find themselves in as well as the two reforms that I will be focusing on. 
Following this, I will discuss general difficulties with pension reform. The discussion 
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then turns to examination of the factors required for successful retrenchment, and 
assessment of the cases in question.  
As we will discover, whether or not a government is able to successfully retrench 
depends on three factors: whether it has the ‘will,’ or motive, to retrench in the current 
political environment, the capability to do so, and the awareness and ability to implement 
low-visibility strategies. I explain each of these three factors in detail, and determine the 
relative importance of each below. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
In this chapter, I will give a brief summary of the history of each country’s 
pension system, as well as the situation they find themselves in. This anchors the 
theoretical discussion to reality, as statistics allow for comprehension of the relative 
magnitude of the crises, or lack thereof as may be. This summary also explicates the 
distinct demographic and budgetary pressures, which composes a background against 
which reform efforts can be measured. 
I must make a brief disclaimer: outcomes, cannot strictly serve as unreserved 
measures of governmental power. This results from the fact that they differ due to their 
relation to stated goals, the ideology of the country, and the level of budget stress.22 
Similarly, the magnitude of change achieved is hardly barometric of governmental 
ability. We cannot thus assume that simply because one country instituted a larger change 
in policy than the other that it has more ability to produce such change.  
Following description of the specific challenges that each country faces, I will 
describe two major pension reforms in detail, one from each country. In the U.K., I will 
be examining the 1986 Social Security Act, which largely shaped the present condition of 
the British pension system. This reform provides excellent examples of the risks and 
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opportunities that institutional structure can provide, while demonstrating their situational 
nature in a majoritarian system. Furthermore, the timing of such a major reform is 
anomalous, and exploration of the factors dictating this result helps to explain this. 
Lastly, the capabilities displayed by the Conservatives contrast sharply with the German 
government’s attempts at reform.  
With regards to Germany, I will be examining the 2001 Riester Reform, for 
several reasons. First, it is a major reform that changed the structure of the German 
pension system. Second, it is a recent reform, aimed at solving the dire problems that 
Germany faces. Third, it provides insight into the ways that institutional effects constrain 
policy-makers, and demonstrates strategies that they may use to combat these constraints. 
Finally, it shares some major similarities with the 1986 SSA, and the time lag between 
the two similar efforts is informative. 
  
 
THE PENSION SYSTEM OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: A BRIEF 
SUMMARY 
 
 The roots of United Kingdom’s modern system can be traced all the way back to 
1908, but it became recognizable in its current iteration in 1944 with the Beveridge 
reform (thus leading to the characterization of the British model as Beveridgean). The 
stated goal of the Beveridgean system is poverty prevention rather than social insurance. 
The British system is essentially a hybrid, and it can be argued that this is the reason for 
its relative success as compared to Germany and indeed most of Europe. The U.K. 
system is divided into separate pillars: first, it provides a universal flat-rate benefit, which 
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basically constitutes a social safety net, along with the National Health Service. For most 
workers, this level of benefits is not consistent with a reasonable replacement rate 
following retirement, and as such most workers are also covered by employer-provided 
or private pensions. In the Beveridgean system, wage increases have almost no impact on 
benefits; rather they are indexed to prices.23 The ideological underpinning for the 
Beveridgean system is thus substantively different than the underpinning for the 
Bismarckian model. This difference can be shown through the breadth of coverage in 
1950: the U.K. system covered 94% of the economically active population, while the 
Bismarckian system only covered 70%.24  
 However, these flat-rate benefits are below the social assistance level, and remain 
especially low for those with high incomes.25 This led to the rise and acceptance of 
occupational pension schemes in the U.K. to 18% 12 years after the 1944 reform, and the 
upward trend continued.26 Today, workers in the U.K. are required by law to belong to an 
earnings-related pension provision scheme provided by the state, an employer, or a 
private personal fund.27 These requirements are clearly indicative of the spirit of the 
Beveridgean system; poverty and its accompanying ills are to be avoided. Contributions 
are loosely related to earnings, and the flat-rate benefit has remained constant in real 
terms since 1980.28  
 Both the flat-rate benefits and the state provision system (referred to as the State 
Earnings Related Pension Scheme, or SERPS) are financed mainly through National 
Insurance contributions.29 Employers and employees pay these, with employers paying 
13.7% and employees paying 7.75%. However, if an employee opts out of SERPS in 
factor of an employer-provided scheme, this contribution is reduced.30 This fund differs 
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from the German system in that it is considered a part of the general budget, and as such 
the difference between revenue and expenditure is made up through government 
contributions, or if the balance is positive, the money is used elsewhere.31  
 Compared to Germany and indeed most European countries, the United Kingdom 
has essentially fixed the problem of financing its pension program. However, the U.K. 
faces different problems attendant to pension provision, notably the level of coverage. Let 
us examine the demographic and budgetary issues. The U.K. has a relatively low birth 
rate as Germany does, as it ranks 181st in the world.32 The life expectancy is 78.9, which 
is also comparable to Germany.33 Yet it has a slightly more favorable age structure: 67% 
of the population is of working age, and 16% is 65+. The OECD projects an increase in 
the 65+ population to 23% in 2030.34 This results in a lower old-age dependency ratio. 
Furthermore, the median age in the U.K. is 39.9, while the median age in Germany is 
43.4, and the trends suggest that Germany’s age structure is relatively ill fated in 
comparison.35  
 The fiscal situation is similarly less alarming in the U.K. The government’s 
general gross liabilities grew from $200 billion in 1990 to $800 billion in 2005.36 While 
this growth is a 300% increase as compared to Germany’s 160% increase over the same 
time period, the U.K.’s debt consists of only 46.5% of the country’s GDP, as opposed to 
Germany’s 70%.37 Benefits paid have increased from $42 billion to $125 billion, but 
again, this increase is to a level of expenditure that is considerably lower than is seen in 
Germany.38 The most telling statistic, however, is the projection of public pension 
expenditure in the U.K. Expenditure in Germany is expected to increase to almost 17% of 
GDP in 2030, while the United Kingdom is projected to increase from its current 
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(extremely low) level of 4.4% to a mere 6.6% of GDP in 2030.39 Finally, the U.K. does 
not face the European Monetary Union’s requirement to maintain a low deficit.  
 Why is it that the U.K. is “the only major industrial country that does not have a 
financial problem in meeting future pension commitments?”40 Bonoli contends that this is 
a result of the 1986 Social Security Act. The main change this act introduced was to 
allow British workers to opt out of either their state or employer-provided ‘second tier’ 
(that is, not the universal flat-rate benefits) pensions and “make individual provision for 
their retirement through a private and personal pension.”41 Bonoli argues that the effect of 
this change is twofold: first, the ideological underpinnings of the system were shifted 
away from guarantor and redistribution. Second, it provides incentive for current 
beneficiaries to opt out of the state scheme. This is a result of the fact that more and more 
workers are accepting private provision, and this reduces the level of contribution to the 
pay-as-you-go state scheme, further giving incentive for workers to leave the state 
scheme due to its decreased ability to meet its obligations.42 Essentially, the success of 
the U.K. in containing cost is due to the rejection in 1986 of a national pay-as-you-go 
system following recognition of the impending demographic changes and ideological 
opposition.43 However, it must be recognized that the U.K. faces problems regarding 
coverage and adequate poverty prevention, as well as the level of replacement rates in the 
overall population. I intend to provide a framework to explain why the U.K. was capable 
of producing effective retrenchment, and why as of yet Germany is not. 
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THE PENSION SYSTEM OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: 
A BRIEF SUMMARY 
 
 Germany is similarly prototypical in terms of public pension systems. Germany 
has had a long history of social welfare programs, dating all the way back to Chancellor 
Bismarck. Examining the history of the German system is important due to its 
ramifications on possible reform courses: starting points tend to dictate policy 
possibilities.1 After World War II, failed attempts to establish a Beveridgean system 
similar to that in the U.K. gave way to the restoration of the original Bismarckian system 
in 1957.2 Germany, unlike the U.K., did not develop a system of universal pension 
coverage. Instead, its public pension system developed piece by piece: different groups in 
Germany are covered differently according to industry, with each group gaining inclusion 
at a different period in time. The social insurance program did not include universal 
coverage when it first appeared; rather it covered industrial workers only. The reasoning 
behind this distinction was clear and political: in 1889, when it was introduced, 
Chancellor Bismarck was concerned with the loyalty and containment of the rapidly 
growing industrial working class.3 This scheme was earnings-related and contributory. 
The goal of the Bismarckian model of public pensions has been labeled social insurance 
as opposed to poverty prevention. Rather than providing a guaranteed minimum level of 
benefits, its stated goal is to maintain the standard of living achieved during working 
life.4 Given the nature of the introduction of the system, it became clear that the best way 
to provide social insurance to other sectors was to progressively provide them with 
coverage.5 Thus, in 1911 white-collar employees were welcomed into the fold, in 1957 
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farmers were included, and other sectors have followed.6 While each sector may be 
covered differently, most are included in the public retirement insurance, or GRV.  
 Approximately 85% of German workers are covered by the monolithic system, 
which is financed in two ways.7 About 70% of the budget is contributed equally by 
employees and employers through a payroll tax, while the Federal government finances 
the other 30% through taxation.8 This system differs from other pay-as-you-go systems in 
that these two portions of the budget are separate. Transfers cannot be made from the 
contributions made by employees and employers; only in the opposite direction can 
transfers be made.9 This is distinct from the United States in that it is not a ‘unified 
budget.’ Since a large proportion of the workforce is covered by this system, and since 
the objective is to provide social insurance replacement rates of about 70%, this pension 
system constitutes a rather large burden on government finances.  
 The current crisis that Germany faces with regards to public pension financing has 
its roots in several issues. The most alarming is the demographic change facing Germany. 
Retired persons’ benefits are financed by the current working population in the 
Bismarckian system, similar to the policy in the United States. However, Germany has an 
ageing problem. Three effects characterize this ageing problem: a low birth rate, high life 
expectancy, and the retirement of the ‘baby boomer’ generation. The birth rate in 
Germany has fallen to about 8.2 births per 1000 persons in 2008, which is the third 
lowest birthrate in the entire world.10 The fertility rate in Germany is 1.3 children per 
woman, which is alarmingly low.11 Yet the life expectancy at birth in Germany was 79.1 
in 2008, which is the 33rd highest in the world.12 Life expectancy is generally considered 
to be relatively simple to predict, and is expected to continue to gradually increase, 
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further exacerbating the issue.13 Also, as life expectancy increases, the replacement rate is 
lowered, as benefits must be spread over more years. Fertility rate is seen to have a larger 
effect on the age structure of a society, as it directly determines the size of the working 
population. This brings the extremely low birth rate in Germany into sharp relief. 
Furthermore, it is clearly more palatable to raise fertility rather than lower life 
expectancy, and this distinction has obvious policy implications that will be discussed 
later. 
 The ramifications of these trends can be measured by an examination of the age 
structure of Germany at present. Currently, the working age population (15-64) composes 
about 66% of the population, while the elderly population (65+) is 20% of the entire 
population.14 This may not appear particularly alarming, until it is considered that the 
OECD projects that in 2030 the elderly population in Germany will be 28% of the total 
population.15 The total effect of this demographic shift means that the old-age 
dependency ratio in Germany will nearly double, from 24% in 2000 to a projected 43% in 
2030.16 This means that the working age population will essentially be supporting a group 
of retirees that is nearly half their own size, in addition to supporting themselves. As a 
result of this dependency-ratio shift, the social security contributions required in order to 
maintain current replacement rates have been projected to exceed 30% of gross income, 
compared to 19.5% in 2003.17 This is a clear indictment of the pay-as-you-go system 
considering the current situation in Germany, and while recent reforms have attempted to 
address this issue, they have fallen short.  
 In particular, the 2001 German Pension Reform, or Riester Reform (named after 
the then labor minister) attempted to address the problems of a strict pay-as-you-go 
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system through several policy changes. The first consisted of several adjustments to the 
current system, including a real reduction in the replacement rate to about 62%. The 
second change consisted of the introduction of separate pension funds, specifically, the 
legalization of private defined contribution retirement funds. Finally, it introduced 
optional supplemental individual retirement accounts.18 Many contend that these changes, 
while meaningful, do not address the primary issue of demographic change and early 
retirement.19 This is alarming considering that according to the OECD, only 40% of the 
population between 55 and 65 is in the workforce.20  
 The outlook for the public pension system is similarly grim upon examination of 
the fiscal situation in Germany. The government’s general gross liabilities, or debt, grew 
from $600 billion in 1990 to $1.6 trillion in 2006, according to the OECD.21 This figure 
is 70% of the entire GDP in Germany, compared to a figure of about 47% in the U.K. and 
62% in the U.S.22 Similarly, benefits paid out in the public pension system grew over the 
same period from $250 billion to $425 billion.23 Public pension spending constituted 
11.8% of GDP in 2000, a relatively large number compared to many other industrialized 
societies, including the United States (4.4%).24 This spending is projected to increase to 
16.5% of GDP in 2030.25 These projections are highly dependent on demographic 
projections, along with the relatively dynamic funding policies.  
 Germany faces a rather pressing dilemma with regards to its budget, and the 
“public pension system is the single largest item in Germany’s social budget.”26 When 
facing decisions regarding fiscal policy, it is quite clear that the public pension system is 
an area of concern, due not only to its size and importance, but also due to projections of 
future growth. As such, it can be argued that the pension system is one of the main 
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reasons for a budgetary dilemma. In short, the ageing of Germany’s population has 
created a crisis that the current government, and subsequent governments, must deal with. 
 
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE 1986 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT  
 
 The 1986 British pension reform serves as a prime example of the policy-making 
possibilities provided by the majoritarian system. This reform introduced a number of 
significant changes that are primarily responsible for the current positive outlook of the 
British pension system. In 1983, the conservatives, led by Margaret Thatcher, won a 144-
seat majority in the House of Commons.1 The reform arguably reflects this large 
majority, and the ideology of the Thatcherites, rather than the exigencies of the time. That 
is not to say that there were not pressures for reform besides ideology: the recent 
introduction of SERPS resulting from the 1975 reform resulted in an expectation of 
future expenditure increases. Furthermore, the level of provision available to ‘early-
leavers’ (workers who changed or left jobs before pension maturation) was considered by 
many inadequate.2 While the latter pressure was mostly addressed by the minor 1985 
reform, the structural changes introduced in 1986 dealt with this problem even further. 
However, the 1986 reform should be seen primarily as a reflection of the wishes and 
ideology of three chief actors, due to the large majority enjoyed by the Conservatives: 
Thatcher as Prime Minister, Norman Fowler as the secretary of state for social services, 
and the Treasury.  
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 Further motivation for the reform is found in the general background of the 
1980’s. The general ascendancy of neoliberal policy and the Conservative Party in 
Britain help to explain the fact that the reform did not seem especially necessary when 
compared to other OECD countries.3 The Thatcher government was broadly interested in 
reducing state expenditure and involvement the market, and reforms tended to reflect this 
shift towards privatization. As Bonoli notes, this ideological factor is important to note 
but its consequences must be seen within the framework of capability.4 
 While the pension system seemed particularly ripe for expenditure reduction to 
the Conservatives, as it was the second largest item on the social budget, it was not a 
wholly inviting target.5 An attack on SERPS, which threatened the government with 
ballooning expenditures, would be an attack on a system of universal benefit, with a tight 
link between contributions and benefits and a large constituency.6 Any threat to universal 
benefits, especially those with a perceived ‘just’ benefit determination, would necessarily 
be unpopular. Furthermore, the Conservatives had publicly backed its creation, creating 
another obstacle. Nevertheless, Fowler undertook a comprehensive examination of the 
system and produced a Green Paper detailing his commission’s findings. He advised the 
“gradual phasing out of SERPS, although all entitlements earned to date would be 
preserved, and the introduction of personal pensions.”7 Several political considerations 
caused a retreat from the proposal to eliminate SERPS, as explored below, and in 
December 1985 the White Paper Programme for Action outlined the final course of 
action.8 This White Paper became the 1986 Social Security Act.  
 The reforms were constrained chiefly by the demands of the three major actors, 
but the most notable constraint was the requirement that the new pension policy be zero-
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cost. Any new programs would have to be financed by cutbacks in existing programs.9 
This requirement was imposed by the Treasury, which was particularly concerned with 
keeping expenditure under control. However, this constraint essentially ran parallel to the 
ideology of the Conservative government to keep spending as low as possible, and most 
likely had little determinant effect.  
 In addition to the containment of the cost of SERPS, the Thatcher government 
was interested in the introduction of personal pensions, for several reasons. Ideologically, 
personal pensions were desirable due to their market characteristics: firms could compete 
to provide them, and in doing so would theoretically produce an efficient outcome. 
Because they would be funded, rather than PAYG, personal pensions would not represent 
a future burden.10 This shift to personal provision would further address the problem of 
early-leavers, as they could carry over from job to job and increase labor mobility at the 
same time. Finally, they enjoyed widespread popular support.11 At the same time that 
these personal pensions were introduced, the government intended to reduce the 
attractiveness of SERPS in order to facilitate the shift towards private provision. The twin 
goals of this reform can thus be understood as the containment of future expenditure and 
a shift away from state welfare provision towards personal provision, which 
simultaneously aided the first goal.  
 When the time came for the passage of the bill, the Labour party ultimately had 
little to no influence over the contents. As the minority party, it could only react publicly 
and comment on its perceived negative effects, and threaten to overturn many of its 
tenets. Eventually, however, Labour began to realize that the scale of the shift towards 
personal pensions precluded any substantial revision.12  
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 The major policy reforms introduced in 1986 were as follows. Whereas before, 
SERPS benefits were calculated based on the twenty best years of average earnings, the 
new formula averaged earnings over a worker’s whole career. The benefit was reduced 
from 25 percent of the relevant (and now expanded) earnings history to 20 percent of 
relevant earnings.13 Also, widows’ and widowers’ would now receive 50 percent of their 
deceased partner’s pension, rather than 100 percent. These changes were phased in over a 
couple of decades.  
 Besides these benefit cuts, the 1986 SSA addressed the issue of personal pensions 
by eliminating or lowering barriers. Previously, one could only contract out of SERPS for 
a defined benefit plan.14 The 1986 SSA allowed for private defined contribution plans, 
and lowered the standard for occupational schemes by creating a new, looser criterion for 
minimum pensions.15 In addition, pension rights would be preserved after 2 years instead 
of the previous standard of 5 years.16 Occupational schemes were made even more 
attractive by granting a 2% contribution rebate to newly-contracted out plans.17 
 In addition, substantial incentives were provided to contract out of SERPS to 
personal pensions (beyond the benefit reductions). Personal pensions were introduced as 
an alternative contract-out option, provided by insurance companies and financial 
institutions on a competitive basis. While second-tier provision was still mandatory for 
those within a range of income, employees now had three choices: SERPS, an 
occupational plan, or a personal plan.18 Those employees who chose this option were 
entitled to a 5.8% rebate in National Insurance contributions, and a further temporary 
(seven year) 2% rebate similar to the one granted to new occupational schemes was 
introduced. In order to discourage exit from occupational schemes, this rebate was only 
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available to those who belonged to SERPS.19 Finally, the government and the pension 
industry engaged in an intense advertisement campaign promoting personal pensions.20 
 The combination of the significant benefit reductions in SERPS and the 
immediate incentives to contract out to occupational or personal pensions produced rapid 
results. The government’s expectation that 500,000 people would contract out was 
substantially eclipsed by reality: from 1988 to 1992, personal pension holders alone 
increased in number from about one million to five million.21 The government estimated 
that due to SERPS benefit reduction alone, expenditure would be cut in half by 2040.22 
The benefits are not particularly generous in the final account: in 2000, the basic state 
pension and SERPS accounted for a replacement rate of about 55% for someone earning 
£9,000 a year, and only 20% for an employee earning £50,000 a year.23 
 Several conclusions can be drawn regarding the effectiveness of this reform. First 
and foremost, the 1986 SSA is widely recognized to be responsible for the current 
positive funding outlook in the U.K. Second, this reform represented a significant 
retrenchment and shift towards private provision, during a period of relatively low 
pressure for change. The pension retrenchment accomplished by the Thatcher 
government was highly visible in nature. However, the final structure did employ low-
visibility policies in order to accomplish some of the more unpopular retrenchment. It 
must be noted that the significant reduction in benefits was justified as a deliberate 
attempt to make SERPS less competitive, in order to promote contracting-out. This fact 
does not mitigate the fact that those who remained in SERPS (those too invested or 
unaware to opt out) did indeed suffer the losses imposed, and therefore the reductions 
remain relevant. The magnitude of the reforms imposed in 1986, and especially the 
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privileged funding outlook enjoyed by the U.K. as a result, have few peers. A complex 
combination of political factors shape the range of possible policy possibilities and cause 
trends towards certain outcomes such as this.
 
 
GERMANY: THE 2001 RIESTER REFORM 
  
In comparison to the 1986 SSA, the recent reforms undertaken by the German 
governments seem relatively ineffective. This is particularly striking considering that the 
German government has consistently faced much larger pressures to reform. The 2001 
Riester Reform serves as an example of a reform that began a transition in the 
fundamental composition of the German pension system, but ultimately fell short when 
measured against the rubric of necessary change.  
In 2001, the German pension system had the second-largest budget in the OECD 
countries. The Social Democrats, led by Gerhard Schröder, attempted to address some of 
the pressing issues facing the German pension system by undertaking the most ambitious 
project of pension reform thus far.1 At the end of the 1990s, the German pension system 
was best characterized as monolithic: 80% of provision came from the GRV, with only 
10% each from occupational pensions and personal pensions. The Social Democrats 
attempted to transform this system into a true multi-pillar system.  
The motivations for this change were varied: the government hoped to reduce its 
budgetary obligation, while at the same time reducing the contribution rate of laborers in 
order to lower non-wage labor costs. Furthermore, the reform aimed to secure the long-
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term stability of pension levels, while also promoting the increased usage of occupational 
and personal schemes.2 These goals were also goals of the 1986 British reform; a shift 
towards privatization and a reduction of the replacement rate provided by the state are 
familiar. However, the fact that they were attempted fifteen years apart seems to indicate 
a lack of political responsiveness in Germany, especially due to the much more dire 
situation. A less pressing goal of the 2001 Reform was old-age poverty prevention, not 
currently an issue in Germany but addressed nonetheless.  
Schröder’s government knew that to pass a major pension reform, it would most 
likely need a majority in the Bundesrat.3 But in 1999, his government lost this majority. 
A unilateral strategy, like that of Thatcher’s governments, would not be an option; 
Schröder could not simply push through his agenda. As explored further on, Schröder 
rejected the classic option of creating a ‘Grand Coalition’ with the opposition party. This 
option had been utilized with increasing frequency in the past few years, because the 
federal government had experienced trouble effectively controlling a majority in the 
Bundesrat.4 While this strategy required cooperation from interests outside of the formal 
government due to the corporatist nature of the German system, a strong enough coalition 
could attempt some circumvention.  
Why did Schröder abandon a ‘Grand Coalition’ strategy? The Christian 
Democrats and the unions rebuffed initial attempts at consensus building as early as 
1999. The Christian Democrats preferred a voluntary approach to private pensions, rather 
than Schröder’s mandatory proposal. The first draft of the bill passed the Schröder-
controlled Bundestag in late 2000, but soon met obstacles in the Bundesrat. Procedural 
regulations require formal and informal negotiations when majorities are split: these 
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regulations are supposed to produce a compromise.5 However, in the end, a solution was 
not reached, but the Schröder government was able to ‘buy’ the support of some of the 
state governments with quid pro quos.6 Despite this final result, the Schröder government 
expended considerable effort to gain the cooperation of the Christian Democrats; this was 
due to institutional demands and the fact that this is the usual strategy in these 
circumstances.  
In order to achieve their agenda, then, the Social Democrats had to take a different 
tack. This involved some circumvention of the corporatist pension policy network, which 
they accomplished by “centralizing decision-making power at the Chancellor’s Office 
and by taking power away from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.”7 However, 
they did include the unions as a partner in their law-making coalition. While the unions 
had been allied with the Christian Democrats, their cooperation was essentially bought 
through injection of desired provisions into the bill. These provisions privilege 
occupational pensions against private pensions somewhat, and allow for greater 
flexibility.8 The unions perceived this as a major gain, as they both achieved their policy 
goal and enjoyed the status of legislative partners.  
Busemeyer notes a striking example of this partnership with the unions. In one 
instance, the head of an influential union contacted Schröder about changing a specific 
provision in the bill. This provision was not a minor provision, and Schröder himself 
consulted Riester and assured the union head that his request would be fulfilled.9 Why 
such acquiescence on the part of the government? Since Schröder had not been successful 
in creating a Grand Coalition, he needed another coalition partner or the bill had very 
little chance of success. The fact that the bill was influenced to such an extent by the 
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unions displays a problem with the institutional structure in Germany: the government, 
while sufficiently resolved to accept the non-cooperation of the opposition, was more 
concerned with the political victory than the final content of the reform. It seems that 
even a government with a specific reform agenda in mind cannot hope to achieve it 
without significant change, whether from the opposition or external interests.  
Börsch-Supan argues that the Riester Reform ultimately does not achieve its 
primary goal of significant retrenchment, while the attempted shift towards privatization 
was more successful. The main changes introduced by the reform were as follows. The 
law mandates contribution rates below 20% of earnings until 2020 and below 22% until 
2030, while the replacement rate must remain about 67%.10 These two objectives seem to 
be incompatible, as contribution rates are largely determinative of replacement rates in a 
PAYG system, but the 2001 Reform skirts this issue by introducing a change in the 
formula for earnings calculation. As a matter of fact, due to the various technical formula 
changes, the average replacement rate will actually fall to about 62%.11 Furthermore, 
while the contribution rates are “substantively reduced” by the reform, they will 
nevertheless rise above 20% by 2014.12 
In addition to the contribution and benefit changes, the reform introduced a new 
instrument intended to serve as a second pillar, called a Riester pension. These pensions 
can be either occupational or private, but are not mandatory.13 They are intended to 
replace the losses imposed by the nominal reduction of the replacement rate. They are not 
universally attractive however; the benefits from the Riester pensions must be distributed 
as an annuity and may not be used as collateral or be bequeathed.14 One of the objectives 
of the reform, then, was to create a complex package of tax subsidies and deferrals in 
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order to incentivize the take-up of these pensions.15 These include a large subsidy during 
the contribution phase, ranging from 50% of the contribution itself for the wealthier to 
90% for the poor.16 The combination of this subsidy with other tax deferrals and 
deductions resulted in the take-up of Riester pensions by 35% of the working population 
by 2003.17  
In Börsch-Supan’s analysis, the Riester pensions will fulfill the objective of 
closing the gap in replacement rates caused by the benefit reductions of the 2001 Reform 
at least for younger cohorts). Furthermore, the initial acceptance rate points towards a 
significant shift in the composition of the German retirement system. Börsch-Supan 
estimates that should other income sources remain relatively constant, Riester pensions 
will constitute about 35% of state-organized retirement income, meaning the monolithic 
PAYG system will account for about 55-60% of total retirement income.  
In addition to all of these major changes, the 2001 reform also included some 
minor tweaks. These include the establishment of a legal right to convert salary into 
pension contributions, the relaxation of investment rules, the permission of defined 
contribution occupational schemes (similar to British efforts fifteen years prior), and an 
old-age minimum income guarantee. 
The analysis so far indicates that the objective of a shift towards privatization is 
achieved by the 2001 Riester Reform. However, the “main litmus test of the Riester 
reform is whether the shift from PAYG to a partially funded pension system will stabilize 
the contribution rates for the younger generation with acceptable replacement rates for 
the older generation.”18 And on the basis of this criterion, Börsch-Supan argues that it 
fails, and unambiguously so. This failure is despite the government’s promise to maintain 
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specific contribution and replacement rates. He calculates that the contribution rates will 
rise to about 24% in 2030, down from a projected 26% before the reform. Furthermore, 
the net replacement rate will fall to 62% by 2030, whereas before the reform it was 
projected to remain around 70%.19 
The German government essentially retrenched benefits through low-visibility 
alterations; while it promised maintenance of the average replacement rate, in reality it is 
to fall. However, Busemeyer contends that rather than being a cost-reductive reform, the 
2001 Riester Reform served primarily as “a considerable recalibration of the public–
private mix in the system,” towards private provision.20 While a shift towards 
privatization sets the stage for cost reduction in the public sphere, ultimately it only 
serves as the first step. It does not stabilize the public PAYG for the foreseeable future.21 
Therefore, the 2001 Riester Reform cannot be seen as a substantially successful 
retrenchment effort. The German government still faces significant issues regarding the 
funding of the PAYG pillar, and while replacement rates will fall as a result of the 
reform, contribution rates will continue to increase. Nothing less than the stabilization, if 
not reduction, of the contribution rate, should be considered retrenchment, because while 
the German government may not bear the direct burden of funding retirement, the 
German people do. An increasing contribution rate represents a serious burden to German 
society, with negative consequences for both employees and employers. Yet examination 
of the political constraints upon policy-makers yields the conclusion that this 
disappointing outcome will tend to occur, and should perhaps be expected in a consensual 
setting. 
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WHY IS RETRENCHMENT GENERALLY PROBLEMATIC? 
 
I argue that institutions provide both opportunities and risks to policy-makers. In 
order to understand what these opportunities and risks are, we must understand why 
retrenchment is generally onerous. We can then assess the efficacy of institutional effects 
at providing opportunities to overcome these general obstacles, or at creating additional 
risks for policy-makers. 
The very nature of loss imposition in the setting of democracy makes it difficult, 
especially in the area of pension provision. Cutbacks in this area are such that they 
involve wide swaths of the population, young and old, rich and poor. This type of cutback 
is different than more targeted cutbacks, and may be labeled ‘redistributive,’ in that they 
are not geographically or occupationally focused.1 As Pierson and Weaver explain, any 
reduction in social insurance affects nearly the entire population. While the elderly are 
often the immediate losers (and politically powerful losers at that) the young not only 
sympathize with their elderly relatives but also may fear for their own future welfare.2 
This creates an environment where it can be politically dangerous for a government to act 
at all: in the United States, Social Security is often colloquially referred to as ‘the third 
rail of American politics.’ Democracy itself proves to be a tough setting for change of 
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this type: long-term budget control and welfare security is not particularly visible, while 
the losses created in the short term by such change are. The power retention desired by 
governments necessitates short-term successes and rarely provide incentive for change 
that is not immediately creditable. For instance, the contentment caused by a welfare 
system reformed in the past is an asset to the party in power rather than the party who 
instituted the change: in short, voters have short memories. Furthermore, scholars have 
suggested the existence of a “negativity bias”—voters are predisposed towards awareness 
of negative results rather than recognition of positive gains.3 Thus, the immediate costs of 
pension reform set against the future gains serve as a strong disincentive to governments 
to engage in such retrenchment.  
 Path dependence also provides insights as to the difficulties of pension reform. 
Before I get into what these might be, some explanation of path dependency is required. 
Path dependency, generally, is a useful construct for understanding how inefficient 
outcomes can be produced in the face of neoclassical notions of convergency. Selection 
of efficient outcomes is usually expected, and path dependency helps us to understand 
why this selection is not universal. This concept frames the limiting effects that history 
has on future policy. 
Pierson explains the concept of path dependence as relevant when social 
processes are characterized by increasing returns and self-reinforcement. Typical 
neoclassical examples tend towards convergence of results: negative feedback forces 
predictable equilibria. Efficient strategies are rewarded, while inferior choices are 
punished. According to a strict interpretation of this model, inefficient outcomes such as 
the QWERTY keyboard would be selected against. However, when each step towards an 
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outcome “produces consequences which make that path more attractive in the next round 
and raises the costs of shifting to an alternative path,” technically inefficient outcomes 
can result.4 Path dependency does not refer to the absence of change, but to the limited 
range of options available.5 While this may seem to imply that change is pre-determined, 
I contend that it functions as an often-indeterminate constriction on the choices that 
institutional effects present. While Bonoli argues that path-dependent views contrast with 
institutionalist thinking, I believe they serve to inform rather than supplant.6 
In terms of pension policy, this can be understood as the effects of policy 
feedback. In Pierson’s view, one source of path dependency is particularly relevant to our 
discussion. Couched in microeconomic terms, this source is the concept of high fixed 
cost. If set-up costs are high, actors will necessarily feel constrained by the opportunity 
costs foregone by factor choice and reluctant to abandon trajectories.7 Pension systems 
are processes that exhibit high fixed costs. Administration of systems encompassing 
millions of people is inherently costly, and to significantly alter the structure of the 
system is often prohibitively expensive.  
Furthermore, the actors involved in administration are subject to the forces 
commonly seen in bureaucratic systems, highlighting general problems with pension 
retrenchment. These forces are explained to be positive feedback: pension programs (and 
welfare programs in general) create their own constituencies.8 Manow contends that these 
programs cause the emergence of interest groups that “support the program’s 
maintenance or expansion and protect it from political attacks.”9 Administration provides 
employment, and programs need support organizations and provide for ‘welfare 
professions’ (for example, financial advisors).10 Furthermore, the beneficiaries of welfare 
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largesse eventually cease to understand how they could have lived without such 
support.11 In sum, these forces act as powerful co-determinants as they wield electoral 
and political influence.  
One particular argument regarding pension policy and based in path dependency 
is especially informative. This argument refers to what is called the ‘double-payment’ 
problem.12 Germany and the U.K. both employ a pay-as-you-go system to finance certain 
tiers of their pension programs, Germany with the GRV and the U.K. with SERPS. A 
proposal to shift away from these pay-as-you-go systems creates a huge problem wherein 
participants are essentially asked to pay twice. Since the previous generation is directly 
linked to the current working generation’s contributions, the pay-as-you-go system must 
be phased out rather than simply eliminated. However, this phase-out is not feasible: the 
current generation would never submit to fund their own retirement as they 
simultaneously fund the previous generation (a notable historical counterexample is the 
United States; however this is an exception beyond the scope of this discussion). 
Therefore, such a burdensome transition period can be seen as an insurmountable 
obstacle to significant shifts away from pay-as-you-go systems. In this way, history 
matters: the policy inheritance has strong limiting effects on the options available to 
policy-makers.13 The sole exception to this effect is seen in the period immediately 
following establishment of PAYG; the immaturity of the program presents a brief 
window of opportunity for escape.14 Path dependency can thus be seen as a limiting but 
not determinative factor regarding pension policy outcomes. Policy inheritances limit 
choices, but a deeper predictive understanding requires knowledge of institutional effects, 
ideology, and governmental competence. 
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INSTITUTIONS MATTER 
 
 Now that we are aware of the general problems that pension reform presents, we 
can proceed to explanation of the critical factors affecting outcomes. One of the most 
important factors can be conceptualized as that of governmental capability. I seek to 
explain how the institutional framework and design present in a democratic country is 
hugely determinative of its capability, especially with regards to loss imposition. 
Examination of institutions and their effects also reveals that they provide another factor 
with explanatory power in addition to capability: accountability. Accountability, while 
not as significant as capability, is quite important when combined with variables speaking 
to the ‘will’ of a government to enact change. Specifically, if various factors such as 
ideology and pressure combine to produce a governmental desire to produce reform, the 
level of accountability present provides us with insight as to whether the government will 
attempt reform.  
 A government must desire reform, and while the general environment suggests 
that they will, the level of reform desired will vary according to ideology and 
accountability. It would be foolish for a government to attempt unpopular and painful 
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retrenchment when they face high accountability; for example, governments will rarely 
engage in such reform close to a likely contentious election. It is possible that ideology 
could become powerful enough to engender desire for reform, but when accountability is 
high, governments may wonder, ‘why bother?’ In other words, even when motivated by 
both ideology and real pressures to reform, accountability can serve to preclude reform 
on the grounds that it the government’s primary objective is to remain in power.  
It is important to explain what enters into determination of the ‘will,’ that is, a 
government’s desire to produce reform. As we discovered above, budgetary and 
demographic pressures provide necessary but not sufficient motivation for reform. 
Ideology also provides necessary motivation, but an environment of low accountability is 
necessary for motivation to be sufficient to produce action. 
Policy inheritances, and the limiting effect they have on choices, are often 
reflective of ideology. Furthermore, ideology serves to further limit the choices. Since 
Germany has historically been concerned with social insurance, any future developments 
must speak to this function (barring any vast ideological shift). Along the same lines, 
developments in the U.K. are understood to be reflective of the goal of poverty 
prevention. These are not merely theoretical issues: parties are able to rally significant 
electoral support based on ideological arguments. Finally, the majoritarian nature of the 
U.K. allows for substantial maneuvering based on ideology and backed by ideological 
rhetoric: witness, for example, the retrenchment that Thatcher’s government was able to 
produce under the guise of free market arguments. This results from the idea of party 
mandate previously explored, as a party in power understands its ideology to be 
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representative and thus propagates it. In addition to being contributory to political culture, 
ideology can be understood to be constrained by this third-tier institutional effect.  
Can we, then, argue that ideology has less predictive power in Germany? I submit 
that while it retains relevance in Germany at a more general level, when the subject at 
hand is party ideology rather than overarching culture it matters more in the U.K. In 
Germany, ideological goals are often subverted by its consensual nature. Parties cannot 
expect to successfully promote its ideological goals in an environment where significant 
compromise is expected and required. The consensual system precludes the vacillation of 
power that is often seen in the U.K.; thus Germany’s generally center-right position on 
the political spectrum is often said to be a consequence of aggregation.1 Intrinsically, 
aggregation lends less weight to ideology than majoritarian determinations of power. The 
importance of ideology in Germany is therefore found at this aggregate level. Policy 
outcomes will be limited by the overall atmospheric ideology present in Germany, 
whereas in the U.K. party ideology holds more predictive power with regards to 
motivation to reform. 
Should a government obtain the ‘will’ to effect significant change in a low-
accountability environment, attention should then turn to capability. This factor arguably 
holds the most determinative power; that is, it accounts for the largest amount of 
variability across countries, for reasons I shall elaborate upon. Finally, governments must 
exhibit competence, and in the case of pension reform, we will discover that this entails 
successful implementation of low-visibility strategies.  
So how is it that institutions determine the power and accountability of a 
government? In order to find that out, we must delve into the nature of the democratic 
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system, and explore the institutional design of each of the countries in question. These 
two factors are closely intertwined and codetermined by institutional effects. 
Institutional effects therefore matter when determining policy outcomes. I will 
now explain what I mean by institutional effects. The literature tends to divide these 
effects into three tiers.2 The first tier is what I shall refer to as structural: that is, what is 
the democratic system categorized as? Is it parliamentary or is it a system of checks and 
balances, like the U.S. system? The second tier involves electoral rules and the 
consequences that these rules have on party organization: are elections determined by 
first-past-the-post (FPTP herein), or is it proportional representation? These rules have 
organizational ramifications, such as a system dominated by a single party or one 
characterized by coalitions of several parties.3 The third tier is concerned with several 
factors, including more details of constitutional architecture (federalism, bicameralism, 
etc.) and what I have referred to as political culture, which usually focuses on the nature 
of cooperation with external interests.  
 In this chapter I seek to elaborate upon these tiers generally and apply them to the 
cases of the U.K. and Germany. I also aim to frame these effects as providing risks and 
opportunities rather than advantages and disadvantages; depending on variable conditions 
within a single institutional framework the framework itself may provide either risks or 
opportunities.4 It is therefore misleading to characterize one system as more 
advantageous to the production of favorable policy outcomes.  
 Institutions not only have an impact on policy outcomes but can also shape the 
goals of political parties and organizations. Organizational objectives are often cast in the 
light of the options provided by the institutional framework.5 This occurs for several 
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reasons: first and foremost, capacity is a precondition for change.6 As Hall explains, 
“organizational position also influences an actor’s definition of his own interests, by 
establishing his institutional responsibilities and relationship to other actors.’”7 (SPEC 
CITE) When considering the choices available, organizations must thus consider whether 
a particular option is viable, and in doing so must examine each tier of institutional 
effects as well as existing policy. In this fashion, institutional effects shape the strategies 
that governments will utilize to accomplish their objectives. 
 These institutional effects are not neutral. In fact, they create a tendency towards 
certain policy choices by reducing the scope of choices available and promoting 
particular options.8 Colomer contends that this is precisely the reason for their existence: 
“institutions promote the existence of collective decisions… [as they] reduce information 
costs… [and] uncertainty about collective outcomes.”9 In fact, Bonoli describes 
institutional variables as those that “set the boundaries within which policy-makers can 
operate.”10 As a result, they can help to account for the difference in outcomes among 
states.11 
 It is also important to consider these effects because the framework is likely to 
endure. It has proven extremely difficult to substantially alter institutional frameworks: 
“even the most inefficient institutions tend to last.”12 The cost of change is too high, 
especially because such change may produce unintended consequences that overwhelm 
the benefits to efficiency.13 Therefore, actors tend to employ strategies to take advantage 
of opportunities provided by institutions rather than try to change them. The strategy that 
parties employ with regards to electoral systems is a prime example of this adaptation.14 
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 The division of institutional effects into tiers is not arbitrary. Consideration of the 
structure of this theoretical foundation is critical to understanding how it works. The first 
tier defines a set of variables that can be tweaked one way or another by the rules 
established in the second tier. For example, a parliamentary government has varying 
levels of capability depending on its electoral rules. Along the same lines, the culture in 
tier three can be thought of as a manipulation of the variables provided by the second tier. 
The first tier can be defined as the question of whether executive and legislative power is 
fused.15 Is it a parliamentary or presidential system? This centers the debate on outcomes, 
because it allows for the second-tier focus on the electoral rules for a parliament or an 
executive. The first tier can also be conceptualized as the broad categorization of the 
governing system as a whole, and this enables discussion regarding the risks and 
opportunities available to generalized systems.  
 The electoral rules that a system utilizes have wide and varying effects on the 
composition of a political culture and more generally, its capability to produce favorable 
policy outcomes. As both cases that I am analyzing are parliamentary in nature, I will 
eschew a discussion on the variance in electoral rules in presidential systems. In the case 
of parliamentary systems, there are several possibilities. Electoral rules may determine 
the landscape of political parties. How many parties are major actors within the system? 
First-past-the-post systems most often create a two-party dichotomy, while proportional 
representation leads to coalition systems. These outcomes are to be expected: in FPTP 
systems, parties must appeal to much broader swaths of the electorate, and therefore 
those parties that do not are not represented. In PR systems, lacking the need to capture 
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more of the electorate than any other party, parties are able to cater to smaller, more 
focused interests.  
The second tier includes not only rules electing decision-makers, but also the 
rules that govern their behavior in the legislature. These rules involve the level of 
consensus necessary to achieve change, and contribute to the level of cooperation 
between parties. The need to achieve a simple majority or a two-thirds majority 
necessarily engenders cooperation, and in multi-party systems this leads to long-term 
coalition building. In FPTP systems, a two-party system is favored because achieving a 
small minority in parliament under these constraints rarely translates into power.  
These electoral rules have varying effects on decision-making capabilities. 
Capacity can be defined as actions that the government can take without negotiation with 
external actors, including the populace.16 Governmental capability is multi-faceted and 
involves many different calculations. Within the discussion of institutions, these 
calculations can be divided into the factors that affect implementation of duties and the 
duties themselves. What are the duties that a capable government must be able to 
perform, and what goes into the determination of their ability to do so? The advantage to 
the tiered framework is that it allows for the calculus of both. Following explication of 
these theoretical effects, we will uncover whether these effects apply to the specific cases 
involved. 
What are a government’s duties, or functions, that require capability? Weaver and 
Rockman enumerate them in three broad categories: steering functions, policy 
maintenance and stability, and political functions. Steering functions can be understood 
as “policy innovation, resource targeting, loss imposition, priority setting, coordination of 
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conflicting objectives, and policy implementation.” Maintenance capabilities are 
generally related to the stability and continuance of enacted policy, while political 
functions are related to representing interests of varying constituencies.17 In light of the 
scope of my discussion, I am interested in focusing primarily upon steering functions. 
Maintenance of policy will receive some attention due to the long-term nature of pension 
policy; fundamentally, though, the question is related more to the difficulty of change, 
which consequently means that maintenance is not the issue at hand. As outlined in the 
introduction, loss imposition is of particular interest, with policy innovation and 
implementation also retaining some importance.  
There are several factors inherent to the second tier entering into the calculation 
of capability to carry out duties. Weaver and Rockman identify five different differences 
that electoral rules can create. First, they define the number of veto points available; this 
is a crucial distinction that will be discussed in detail below. Second, these rules define 
the cohesiveness of the leadership. Third, they are visible in the resistance of 
governments to short-term pressure; fourth, in leadership stability over time; finally, in 
the access granted to external interests.18 This last distinction hints at the third-tier 
definition of political culture. How each of these factors is influenced by particular 
electoral rules will be discussed in each specific case.  
So far, I have established that electoral rules involving both the selection of 
decision-makers and their behavior once elected contribute to the composition of the 
system in general, and thus speak to capability. Third tier effects complicate this picture 
even further, because the culture within which decision-makers exist is not a vacuum. 
The third tier involves several factors that must be considered as important institutional 
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effects. One regards the vertical composition of government: how strong are federalist 
forces? This raises questions not only of the power of the central government, but also of 
the necessity of cooperation between levels of government in the areas of policy 
conception and implementation. This brings us to another factor, that of the nature of the 
legislature: is it bicameral? How are the different houses composed? Furthermore, within 
these institutions, what are the formal and informal rules governing party behavior? What 
is the traditional level of party discipline? As explained above, this cohesiveness may be 
a factor determined by electoral rules. If a single party dominates a government, it may 
be critical for a member of the party to ‘toe the line.’ On the other hand, this domination 
may provide critical political cover for members who need to explain to constituencies 
why they voted for unfavorable policies: they can blame party leadership.19 Another 
crucial third-tier factor is the legacy of existing policies that governments must deal with, 
and I shall discuss this further below.20 Finally, what is the historical political culture 
present in the country? This is often co-determined by the structures created by the 
electoral rules. For instance, is the nation historically majoritarian in nature or does it 
have a history of corporatism?21 
These factors affect capability in the following ways. Along with the 
consequences of a certain level of federalism explored above, federalism also provides 
“strong incentives for policy innovation as each level of government tries to control a 
policy jurisdiction before the other does.”22 A bicameral legislature is most likely to 
become important as a factor in policy outcomes when the houses can ruled by different 
political parties while having similar influence over policy results.23 If the legislature 
cannot be split in this fashion, or if one house is limited in terms of influence, it will 
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necessarily have different capabilities. Party discipline can be understood in terms of 
cohesiveness of the leadership. These factors are all contributory to the determination of a 
system as majoritarian or consensual. The final distinction that must be made is due to the 
definition of corporatism, which is a facet of political culture related to, but not 
synonymous with, consensualism.  
First, let us address the characteristics of a majoritarian system. These systems are 
created through use of parliamentary government and FPTP rules. A majoritarian 
government’s policy objectives are mostly independent from anything besides the party’s 
objectives. While these objectives are necessarily shaped by outside interests, once they 
are defined it is usually difficult to prevent the party in power from accomplishing its 
objectives. Majoritarian governments are usually the most powerful examples of 
democratic governments.24 These governments tend to demonstrate high levels of 
cohesiveness and stability of leadership, resistance to short-term pressures, and grant very 
low levels of outside interest influence.  
 A consensual system, on the other hand, is created in parliamentary systems when 
proportional representation is used. Policy-making by these governments tends to be 
more inclusive in general. This stems from the fact that in order to enact change, they 
must gain a majority in a legislature that is not dominated by a single party. Therefore, 
cooperation is crucial. These coalitional systems necessitate policies that conform to the 
wishes of several different interests (so as to capture the cooperation of other parties) 
rather than a single party’s objective. The ‘government,’ then, is not a monolith but a 
conglomeration. Furthermore, they tend to enhance the power of the center: the center 
party becomes the pivot, lending power either to the left or right.25 Policies appear 
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consensual as a result, and closer to the average citizen’s preferences.26 However, these 
governments are associated with a low level of capability in the area of policy-making, 
with low levels of leadership cohesiveness and stability, resistance to short-term 
pressures, and high levels of external influence. Cohesiveness is not as simple a matter in 
majoritarian governments as coalition-building constantly tests the allegiance of party 
members.  
 Finally, the corporatist system, which may be defined as a sort of subset of the 
consensual system has many ramifications for policy outcomes. Primarily, this construct 
is concerned with interest management. Corporatism can be defined as “a system of 
interest intermediation in which groups supporting different (and often conflicting) 
interests are included in policy-making.”27 These practices are typically associated with 
strong labor unions and employers’ associations.28 Moreover, countries with corporatist 
traditions not only allow high levels of access to interest groups, but actually have 
standard procedures requiring such access and consultation.29 Corporatism can therefore 
be thought of not only as an operational reality but a reflection of a political culture that 
emphasizes cooperation and compromise. In addition, the development of corporatism is 
often a result of a system with many veto points, because they create incentives for 
cooperation.  
Corporatism has both advantages and disadvantages. It helps the government to 
mobilize unions and employers in support of far-reaching measures because they are 
included in the decision-making process.30 It also provides a formal method of achieving 
an important objective: coordination of interests.31 This mechanism allows labor unions 
and employers to articulate their preferences.32 While this achieves the objective of 
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interest coordination, it is likely to be simultaneously detrimental to the objective of 
enacting meaningful policy change. In more general terms, Colomer has suggested that if 
“efficacy in decision-making and policy… were priority values, a majoritarian and 
unitary institutional framework favoring clear and robust decisions should be 
preferred.”33 This suggests that corporatism tends to encounter difficulties in producing 
cohesive policy outcomes, though Colomer goes on to note that corporatism is favorable 
“where social consensus is highly valued.”34 While it may be preferable to reserve value 
judgments due to different policy objectives, it is important to recognize that these policy 
objectives play a critical role in the determination of outcomes. Yet, since this discussion 
is also focused on governmental capability, it may not be possible to cast at least a small 
amount of aspersion upon a value system that is detrimental to such capability.  
Veto points are particularly relevant to capabilities, so much so that they establish 
an analytical framework of their own. They still adhere to the three-tiered institutional 
model, however, as each veto point can be placed into one of the tiers. Fundamentally, a 
veto point is a “point at which a suitable coalition of actors can stop the policy-making 
process.”35 Bonoli contends that these have emerged as major constrictions of 
governmental capability to enact favorable policy outcomes. The number of veto points 
present within a system is inversely correlated with the relative power of a government. 
Also, they bear particular relevance to the analysis of pension retrenchment, and loss 
imposition in general.36 So where is it that these veto points lie?  
In the first tier, the most important veto points arguably arise from the “degree of 
control that the government can exert over parliament.”37 If, for example, the government 
is elected by parliament, ‘divided government’ is prevented.38 One sector of the 
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government cannot block the policy of another, as the government is monolithic. Another 
veto point that arises from this continuum can be seen in governments that cannot suffer 
votes of no-confidence, as in these cases members can confidently vote against their 
government’s position without worrying about its survival.39 This distinction also can be 
seen as a third-tier effect, as the first and second tier rules governing the composition of 
the government dictate the level of party discipline. While the ability to almost 
immediately bring down the government based on an unpopular policy may in some 
instances present a veto point to opposition parties, this situation is not oft seen. 
However, this situation provides a key example of how institutions provide risks and 
opportunities, entirely dependent on conditions (e.g. the strength of the opposition party).  
Many opportunities for veto points lie in the composition of electoral rules, or in 
the second tier. The difference between FPTP and PR gives us one example. The nature 
of coalition governments necessarily demands that coalitions be weak: the very parties 
composing a coalition will be competing for votes during the next election.40 Therefore, 
they have strong incentives to defect to whichever side they predict to be the winner.41 
But in the case that an unpopular policy succeeds, and thus the coalition that produced it 
nominally be declared the winner, it may be the case that it is more advantageous from an 
electoral standpoint to be on the side that did not produce the offending policy. This 
deliberate calculation of self-interest by coalition members can be seen as a significant 
veto point, as it will tend to deter the passage of unpopular policies. Other veto points 
related to the electoral rules may include popular referendums and a dual executive.42  
As I explain below, bicameralism (a third-tier effect) presents difficulties only 
when the second-tier consequences are aligned properly: if both houses do not have equal 
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power, or if they are likely to be dominated by the same party, then bicameralism does 
not constitute a veto point. Corporatism, as defined below, presents several veto points as 
a result of the level of inclusiveness given to unions and employers that may seek to 
block legislation; this is however a complex force that may tend to induce fewer rather 
than more veto points.  
Overall, veto points are not only determinative of a government’s power and 
policy-making capability, but are generally reflective of said power. Institutional designs 
that afford more power to the government naturally limit veto points, and vice versa. 
Veto points can be seen as an indicator of the government’s power to control policy-
making outcomes in an environment of opposition; but I would argue that the 
determination of capability is more complex.43 Bonoli uses veto points as a foundation 
for a discussion on the balance between power and accountability, and I intend to discuss 
this balance within the institutional framework that I have developed thus far. 
At a general level, this debate between institutional frameworks can be cast as a 
polar interaction between capability and accountability. This portrayal is generated 
initially through consideration of the merits of veto points in governments desiring 
capability, especially to impose loss and achieve policy innovation and implementation. 
As discussed above, these are the capabilities that we are primarily concerned with when 
it comes to pension policy. Recall that the absence of veto points can be used as a rough 
measure of capability. Pierson and Weaver, along with many others, explain that while a 
parliamentary government that has few veto points ostensibly has a lot of capability, this 
power is checked by the corresponding increase in accountability.44 In other words, while 
the government has a lot of power in the area of policy-making, the electorate is keenly 
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aware of this fact and eager to demonstrate their knowledge of this centralization of 
power. The government has the ability to prevent interests from experiencing losses, and 
thus is to be blamed when they suffer.45 We must then explore the conditions that lead to 
either power or accountability outweighing the other; remember that institutional effects 
are opportunities or risks depending on the conditions. The opportunities, then, are the 
opportunities generated by policy-making power, while the risks are based in 
accountability.  
Accountability has both preventive and retributive effects; legislators may choose 
to allow for concession in order to limit accountability or they may be held accountable 
after unpopular policies are enacted. Majoritarian governments tend to suffer retributive 
consequences, while corporatist governments are based on the premise that accountability 
calculations should be included in policy formation, and they therefore largely avoid 
retributive effects. Also, while increased power is accompanied by increased 
accountability, the accountability of opposition parties in majoritarian systems is 
decreased. These opposition parties are understood to be adversarial, and thus garner little 
to no ill will from the populace when attempting to block or change policy outcomes. 
Since opposition parties have no chance of furthering their agenda, they can only hope to 
influence outcomes by placing blame on the current government.46 It may be allowed, 
however, that some preventive effects are seen in these circumstances as governments 
anticipate such blame generation.47 
I have explained generally how power is generated; what are the factors causing 
accountability of varying levels? Bonoli outlines three separate factors in his analysis. 
The first is the level of competition that the opposition party provides. In the case where 
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no palatable alternative can be seen to the present government, accountability is likely to 
be low. The level of competition provided by the opposition party is most often lowered 
through intra-party divisions, which splits their electoral base and strengthens the 
government. Second, what I have labeled retributive effects of accountability (see above) 
are less likely to play a role in PR systems. This is a perfect example of a second-tier 
effect, as the design of electoral rules entails a difference in “the impact of swings in the 
public mood” and thus capability.48 Finally, Bonoli argues that the balance between 
power and accountability is likely to vary within a single system as a function of the 
political cycle. Accountability is more likely to overwhelm power the closer an election 
becomes due to the relatively short memory of the electorate and the increased sensitivity 
of politicians to the desires of their constituents.49 
This relation between power and accountability, and its varying balance in 
different forms of parliamentary government, has been conceptualized as an increase in 
predictability of outcome.50 This brings us back to veto points: while the level of veto 
points does not allow for consistent definition of policy-making power, it does allow for 
definition of the level of certainty inherent to a government’s capability. The capabilities 
of governments with a large amount of veto points are generally more uncertain, as it 
allows access to the decision-making process to external actors.51 When decisions are 
contained within the context of a government that is responding to specific incentives 
related to its power and accountability, the task of policy-makers and commentators is 
eased. I concede that in the final consideration of power and accountability that 
accountability does indeed have a mitigating effect on centralized decision-making. 
However, the uncertainty inherent to the corporatist tradition can be added to its relative 
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lack of capability when considering its merits. In conclusion, it is clear that the calculus 
of power and accountability operates within the institutional framework, and therefore 
contributes to the importance of institutions to the determination of policy outcomes. It 
also helps to frame the effects of institutionalism as opportunities and risks that are 
dependent on conditions present in the second and third tier of institutional effects rather 
than simply advantages and disadvantages.   
Now that we have firm definition of the factors determining both capability and 
accountability, let us turn to examination of the particular cases.  
 
 
INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 It has been generally established that the reform adopted in the U.K. has reflected 
the government’s priorities to a large extent, and has been imposed in the face of strong 
external opposition.1 Let us now delve into the specific institutional effects that have 
produced this result. From a broad perspective, one may conclude that due to its 
majoritarian nature, this result is almost a foregone conclusion. In fact, the specific 
institutions and effects present in the U.K. have amplified the predictability of outcome. 
What, then, is the institutional structure? 
 The U.K. has an asymmetrical majoritarian parliamentary system of government. 
Its parliament is, after all, ‘the mother of all parliaments,’ and has been used as a model 
for legislatures around the world. It is composed of two houses, the House of Lords and 
the House of Commons. The House of Commons has 646 members, while the House of 
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Lords has about 200 active members. The sovereignty of Parliament is supreme in the 
United Kingdom; strictly speaking, there are no constraints on its power.2 As this system 
is parliamentary in nature and not presidential, I will gloss over the first-tier distinctions 
for the most part. However, we may now advance the discussion to second-tier effects, 
which are mostly based in electoral rules.  
 A government in the U.K. is selected and supported by the majority party in 
Parliament. However, due to the fact that Britain has no written constitution but rather a 
system of laws and traditions built up over centuries, “the exact constitution of the 
‘government’ is as ambiguous as everything else in the unwritten constitution.”3 In 
practice, it is sufficient to say that all members must be drawn from a House of 
Parliament, and they are all either MPs (elected members of the House of Commons) or 
peers (appointed members of the House of Lords) of the majority party.4 The core of the 
government is not located in Parliament but the Cabinet, which serves as the “central 
coordinating and policy-making body… [and] the effective center of the executive.”5 
This government, while supported by the majority party in the House of Commons, can 
essentially do whatever it wants, with no constitutional checks on its authority. In 
practice, though, there are practical limits on its powers.6 These include the support of the 
populace and interest groups, though these rarely have influence unless powerfully 
motivated.  
 Perhaps the most powerful second-tier effect in the U.K. is its use of the first-past-
the-post electoral system. There is no requirement for a majority in order to secure 
election, only plurality. This system sets the bar very high for third-party entry; some 
estimates place it at 37-8%.7 In other words, this system is most likely to be dominated by 
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one of two parties, and at most three. Historically, this is accurate as either the Labour 
and the Conservatives have formed the government in the past half-century or so, but a 
third party (the Liberal Democrats) has recently achieved significant gains in influence. 
FPTP in the U.K. has usually produced large pluralities in the House of Commons for the 
leading party. It restricts effective representation in Parliament to two parties, and 
promotes the strong single-party majority that is most often seen.8 A major consequence 
of this strong majority is the ability of parties to ignore many interest groups and their 
demands: the tyranny of the majority can be quite clearly seen.9 As the government needs 
only the support of the majority party in the House of Commons, there is no need to 
attain a supermajority. This fact has many effects on the political culture and the behavior 
of policy-makers. 
 As stated above, Parliament is fundamentally asymmetrical. This owes to the fact 
that the influence of the House of Lords is “indirect and diffuse.”10 It does not have veto 
power over legislation, only the power to delay, and as such can be seen as having only 
marginal effect.11 Therefore, even though it is technically bicameral, it is more useful to 
analyze the House of Commons rather than Parliament as a whole. In terms of analysis of 
policy-making, the House of Commons is relevant mostly as a “context in which 
government operates… it provides the forum in which the partisan contenders for power 
meet, but in itself it is fairly neutral.”12  
It is now possible to explicate the effect that specific British institutional effects 
have on the factors affecting governmental capability to perform duties. The first factor 
that Weaver and Rockman outline is veto points. Bicameralism is not a veto point in the 
U.K.:  the asymmetry inherent to the system constrains the opportunities to stop the 
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policy-making process within the House of Commons and thus the Cabinet. Veto points 
stemming from either a dual executive or popular referendums similarly have no 
relevance in Britain; the monarch’s role is ceremonial in nature. Due to the dynamics 
created by FPTP in the House of Commons, veto points relating to coalitions do not 
usually exist either. Again, veto points, as institutional effects, are variable within a 
single governmental structure dependent on conditions: situations requiring coalition-
building in the U.K. could be imagined, but in practice rarely occur. The veto points 
described so far do not exist in the U.K. because of the FPTP system.  
First-tier effects also limit veto points in Britain. Divided government is 
prevented, as the government in the U.K. is monolithic. Furthermore, since the 
government can suffer a vote of no confidence (despite its rarity) the institutional mindset 
of MPs is such that they may not vote against their government’s position, and another 
veto point is precluded. Nevertheless, the ability to bring down a government in such a 
fashion can be thought of as a conditional veto point, as it is possible that extraordinarily 
unpopular measures will lead to the defeat of a government.  
The institutional mindset present in Parliament and the Cabinet presents important 
implications for veto points, and is also critical to comprehension of capability. The 
political culture in the U.K. is borne out of the idea of party mandate. This is the idea that 
the electorate through Parliament has endorsed the government; the government is both 
entitled and required to enact its agenda.13 Budge argues that this “downgrades the 
importance of Parliament, as it gives the government direct popular authority.”14 
Moreover, since the sole duty of the opposition is to produce discontent with the current 
government’s policies, the culture can be best characterized as authoritative but 
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adversarial. Therefore, MPs in Parliament are not particularly burdened by the duties of 
policy-making but only charged with loyalty through voting support (at least, in the case 
of the majority party). As the parties select MPs for candidacy, strict party discipline is 
assured. Furthermore, since members of the government are all members of the majority 
party, they too are charged with strict loyalty; they will lose their position by opposing 
policy in any way.15 
Parliament is not a forum for veto of policy then; instead it can be seen as a tool to 
influence popular opinion regarding the government.16 Government measures are 
automatically approved by Parliament due to the widespread level of acceptance of the 
party mandate. There is almost total exclusion of the possibility of defection or 
meaningful opposition of policy, and this necessarily shapes the direction of policy.  
Weaver and Rockman point to several more factors accounting for capability. The 
level of cohesiveness of leadership is very high in the U.K. due to both second and third 
tier institutional effects (primarily, electoral rules and party mandate). The government is 
very resistant to short-term pressure: the government decides when to dissolve Parliament 
and call elections (with the requirement that it be within five years of election) with the 
exception of a vote of no confidence. Using the idea that it possesses a strong mandate, 
the government can quiet any opposition relatively simply. Since opposition has no veto 
power, short-term pressure is limited to debate in the public sphere, which speaks only to 
the possible outcome of a future election. This also allows for the designation of 
leadership stability as high. The final factor is access granted to external interests, which 
in the U.K. is low, again due to the idea of party mandate and the nature of the 
bureaucracy.  
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A considerable amount of importance can be seen in the role of the civil service in 
the U.K. because, as the vertical extension of the Cabinet, it engages in the actual 
formation of policy. Although the “generalist nature of the civil service as a whole 
renders it in fact particularly dependent on advice from outside specialists,” this should 
not be construed as the supply of a high level of access to external interests.17 This 
argument speaks to the culture and structure of the bureaucracy. The composition of the 
bureaucracy is largely non-political; the only people in a particular Ministry appointed by 
the current government are the political heads/representatives at the top of the hierarchy. 
Therefore, the norm is for these Ministers to work with the inherited, permanent, non-
politically appointed civil servants.18 These civil servants are often interested in 
advancement of their department’s goals rather than reflecting the current government’s 
agenda, which places a premium on skilled management by Ministers.  
The civil service is often categorized as generalist because the culture favors the 
idea that non-technical administrators are more capable of producing favorable outcomes 
than technical specialists, through coordination of advice from many specialists.19 
Moreover, servants will often change departments based on the merit of their 
achievements related to the advancement of their Ministry’s agenda rather than their 
technical mastery of a particular specialty.20 These generalist administrators rely on 
advice from many different sources to form policy.  
However, the reason why, despite the level of outside consultation necessary, this 
does not constitute wide access for interest groups lies in the culture of the civil service. 
Ministries use networks of specialists and outside interests to form their departmental 
view, gain information, and guarantee compliance.21 Due to the predictable trajectory of 
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policy once decided upon by a government, a large amount of importance is placed on 
influence at this stage, almost to the point that it can be seen as the only access point. But 
this is not an open process: obtaining status as a useful consultant is difficult, and there 
are ‘club rules’ to be followed. These involve a ban on leaks to the media, as well as 
acceptance of ultimate decisions.22 That is, if external interests wish their views to be 
heard, they must be silent after their input is registered regardless of the outcome.  
In general, the government allows access to external interests, but this access must 
be seen as a privilege rather than a right. The civil service relies on outside interests 
primarily because of a lack of resources, and therefore departments consult those interests 
that it believes would further its own objectives. Access to interests is thus provided more 
or less voluntarily rather than as a matter of course. As we have seen, policies are 
relatively stable once decided upon due to leadership cohesion. Therefore, as the only 
real access point for external interests, this proves to be relatively weak.  
The essence of this consultation process does have ramifications for policy-
makers. The needs that produce consultation in the first place dictate the kind of interests 
that are consulted. Budge contends that these groups, especially in the economic sphere, 
are usually ‘peak’ associations: amalgams of employer associations, for example.23 These 
groups are able to provide good information to civil servants, but the downside is that 
they are not able to procure the cooperation of their members (one of the reasons that 
external groups are consulted to begin with).24 The government retains the ability to 
simply forgo consultation, and so as a veto point or a measure of capability, interest 
access is limited.  
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It is clear that governments in the United Kingdom may possess extreme levels of 
capability. The relative level of capability is of course dependent on electoral results, but 
circumstances may arise leading to capability unparalleled in consensual countries like 
Germany. The capability demonstrated by the Conservatives in 1986 is a prime example 
of the heights of power British governments may rise to. 
Let us then turn to the level of accountability. As this is a conditional factor, this 
analysis is perhaps limited in application to the observed conditions. Accountability is 
high when the level of competition that an opposition party presents is also high: FPTP 
lowers this level of competition to a mostly polar state of affairs. When either the 
Conservatives or Labour are weak and out of power, accountability is going to be low 
despite the presence of a second opposition party (the Liberal Democrats). Of course, this 
is also dependent on the timing of a policy suggestion, and policies are theoretically more 
likely to reflect governmental objectives when implemented during the beginning of a 
term. The other factor is contingent upon electoral rules, and this creates a crucial 
distinction between the U.K. and Germany.  
Specifically, the FPTP nature of the U.K. system leads to a difference in the speed 
and magnitude of change. Even though this system allows for a good deal of resistance 
and deflection of major opposition, it creates a ‘turning point.’25 Essentially, resistance 
must reach a critical mass in order to influence the policy-making process. Interests can 
be ignored so long as they do not provide widespread resistance. FPTP systems are 
always characterized as subject to wide swings in party influence because it is a winner-
take-all system. There is no prize for second place, so to speak, and while the difference 
between second and first place can be wide, if sufficient weight is granted to the 
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opposition, shifts can be dramatic. Similarly, policy change in Britain has been seen as 
dramatic rather than incremental; Budge argues this is due to the idea that “the electoral 
system creates a critical situation by suddenly registering the strength of the 
movement.”26 Combined with the power afforded policy-makers, wide and sweeping 
change is most likely to be the norm in the United Kingdom.  
In the United Kingdom, we see that levels of capability and accountability can 
vary widely as a result of the institutional framework present. It is important to note for 
the sake of our discussion that capability can be extreme, with only modest 
accountability. Therefore, according to my model, if the will to produce effective reform 
is found, such reform will be eminently possible in the United Kingdom, with the 
qualification that the proper conditions of high capability and modest accountability be 
satisfied.  
This analysis is enlightening with regards to the puzzle of the 1986 reform. Again, 
a model relying on pressures to predict outcomes is unable to explain such an anomalous 
reform, undertaken at a time when it was relatively unnecessary. However, the ideology 
of the Thatcherites provided the will to reform, and as I explain below, with low 
accountability and high capability the reform can therefore be seen almost as a foregone 
conclusion in a country like the United Kingdom. Finally, it is a great example of the 
importance of low-visibility policy, as I will explore below.
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INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY 
 
Discussion of the capability and accountability provided by institutions in 
Germany is similarly enlightening as to the outcome of the 2001 reform. Germany has 
what is often referred to as a symmetrical consensual form of government. This definition 
refers to both second-tier and third-tier institutional effects; electoral rules, the 
constitutional structure, and the political culture defined in part by these factors create 
this distinction. The legislature is composed of two houses, the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat. The Bundestag is currently composed of 612 members, while the Bundesrat 
has 69 members. Both the electoral rules and the rules governing legislative power in 
these two houses are vital to comprehension of the consensual nature of the German 
government. Specifically, these rules are the symmetrical nature of the houses and the 
proportional representation system used. In addition to these second-tier effects, 
federalism and the corporatist culture complete explication of the capability of the 
German government, especially to impose loss. These factors all combine to allow 
characterization of the German system as especially cooperative and coalition-based.  
 The Bundestag is technically the lower house of the legislature, and the citizens of 
Germany directly elect its members. The Bundesrat, on the other hand, has peculiarities 
not oft seen in upper houses of parliament; its members are not elected at all. Rather, they 
are appointed by state cabinets. The power of these houses is much more symmetrical 
than the distinction of the houses as being lower and upper, especially compared to the 
United Kingdom, but there is still some power differentiation. The consensual tendencies 
of the Bundestag are caused by the PR system governing its constitution, while the 
 63 
coalition tendencies of the Bundesrat are reflective of the federalist nature of the German 
system and the specific rules governing decision-making within the body.  
 Citizens of Germany cast two votes when electing members to the Bundestag. 
The first vote is a vote for a candidate to represent their constituency, while the second is 
a vote for a party list.1 To those unfamiliar with the concept of a party list, a vote for a 
party list is a vote for a specific party rather than a specific candidate. Thus, while 50% of 
the seats in the Bundestag are given to constituency candidates elected using FPTP, the 
other 50% is allocated to parties in direct proportion to the amount of votes cast for their 
lists. These parties then select candidates to sit in the Bundestag. In reality, even 
constituency members are party members and thus subject to party discipline.2 One of the 
qualifications for this system is that a party must receive at least 5% of the party list vote 
(or three constituency candidates using FPTP) to be awarded seats reserved for party list 
votes.3 This serves to deter extremist parties, and tends to slightly restrict proportionality. 
However, the 5% restriction is sufficiently low to allow for multi-polar party 
representation.  
 The Bundestag shares some similarities with the House of Commons in Britain; 
for example its members elect the Chancellor by a majority vote. Due to its proportional 
constitution as a result of the PR system, a single party rarely gains a majority. But unlike 
in the U.K., where FPTP prevents minor party from gaining seats, there can be many 
more than three parties seated. For example, there are currently six parties seated in the 
Bundestag. This necessitates coalition building between parties, especially when it comes 
to election of the Chancellor and the passage of major legislation. This mandate is 
furthered by the rules governing some of the duties that the house has, including the 
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selection of federal judges and changes to the constitution.4 In some cases, the two-thirds 
rule even requires that the major governing party and major opposition cooperate, a 
proposition almost unheard of in many parliamentary democracies.5 
As Schmidt notes, much of the literature tends to focus excessively on the 
Bundestag as the determining house in the legislature. This focus “underestimates the 
importance of federalism and the impact of elections in each of the sixteen states on the 
composition of… the influential Bundesrat.”6 Votes on significant domestic legislation 
are subject to the veto power of the Bundesrat, making pension retrenchment especially 
focused on its powers. Bundesrat members are appointed by members of each state 
cabinet in proportion to the population of the state, much as members of the House of 
Representatives in the United States are allocated according to state populations. But in 
fact, each of the sixteen states is not afforded members, but instead votes. Each state has a 
minimum of three votes, and it sends appointees to represent these votes in the Bundesrat. 
The votes are thus the state’s votes, not the delegate’s: each state could simply send one 
representative. Complicating the equation is the fact that the state cabinets appoint these 
delegates, and state government elections are not coordinated. Therefore, the composition 
of the Bundesrat can change after any state election.7 In combination with the usual bloc-
like voting of each state, this places an unusual emphasis on the federalist aspects of 
government.  
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the Bundesrat has veto power over major bills. 
It exercises this power by absolute majority only. Since state governments exhibit the 
same coalition tendencies as the Bundestag, in and of itself the absolute majority 
requirement reflects divisions along similar party lines as the Bundestag, again 
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necessitating coalition building. In fact, coalitions are necessary even at the state level, 
because states have the right to abstain in majority votes if coalitions cannot agree on a 
policy. This rule has a caveat: an abstention in the Bundesrat counts as a “nay” vote, and 
as such is not a constructive outcome. This serves to promote cooperation at every level 
of government. In practice, the second-tier rules governing the operation of the Bundesrat 
often requires both cooperation between the major party in power and the major 
opposition power as well as coordination between a coalition at the federal level and a 
majority of state governments in order to govern through legislation.8 Finally, rules 
governing the selection of members of the two houses do not guarantee united 
government; this will be addressed later.  
The mix of proportional representation and federalism tends to provide German 
policy-makers with two choices: accept blockage of major legislation and the policy-
making process or accept compromise with the major opposition party, as coalition is 
necessary at so many levels of government.9 Outcomes dependent on this decision are 
especially prevalent when divided government (as defined as divided control of the two 
houses) is present; due to each house having determinate power over passage of major 
legislation, a majority party in one house cannot hope to simply jam legislation through. 
Power sharing in Germany creates a tendency away from hegemony; cooperation is the 
norm. This power sharing is accompanied by significant risk for the majority coalition, 
however. The constituencies represented by parties naturally expect results to mirror their 
expectations and the party platform; each coalition faces the problem of ‘selling’ their 
cooperation with the opposing faction to their constituents.10 So even while compromise 
may seem a better alternative than a stoppage of the policy-making process, voters expect 
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confrontation rather than concession. Thus the politics of coalitions enter into the balance 
of power versus accountability. 
How does this all relate to the capability framework? I have described most first 
and second-tier effects, and have briefly touched on a third-tier effect (bicameralism). In 
the final balance, third-tier effects are perhaps the most powerful in Germany: namely, 
federalism and corporatism. These effects, like most third-tier effects, are partly 
determined by second-tier effects; for example, the importance of federalism is amplified 
by voting rules in the Bundesrat. Moreover, federalism has implications for corporatism 
in Germany, as it provides a multitude of access points for interest groups seeking veto 
power. These effects almost uniformly tend towards promoting cooperation, but this 
cooperation is not without risks. As a result, policy-makers face significant obstacles 
when attempting to create and implement legislation. 
The federalist nature of the German system is absolutely determined through 
institutional effects. As explained above, the Bundesrat is a part of this equation. In 
addition, “few federal Ministries have the resources to implement and monitor the 
policies enacted by the federal government.”11 The federal government does not bear the 
responsibility or duty of implementation; this duty is left to the states and ‘parapublic’ 
institutions such as the social insurance funds that we are herein concerned with.12 
Therefore, the national government governs, but does not have direct control over 
administration.13 This shapes the timing of influence that states have on policy-making, 
because it hands considerable leverage to state officials.14 While the federal government 
often attempts to circumvent this issue by making policy as specific as possible so as to 
limit creative state interpretation, the power afforded states in such administration is often 
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enough to force inclusion at an early stage of the policy-making process.15 Accordingly, 
cooperation is not simply forced by the influence of the Bundesrat: the lack of a strong 
centralized government capable of effective administration also demands high levels of 
coordination at all levels of government. Policy-makers must take care to shape policy to 
please coalitions in the federal and state governments; even without taking account of the 
corporatist culture of Germany we see a very complex set of incentives and mandates.  
What about corporatism, then? Defined above as “a system of interest 
intermediation in which groups supporting different (and often conflicting) interests are 
included in policymaking,” corporatism plays a huge role in policy-making in Germany. 
Germany formally incorporates consultation with interest groups by making it procedure 
in federal Ministries to consult groups affected by possible legislation.16 Contrast this 
with the U.K., which usually consults outside groups only if the civil service deems it 
helpful. In fact, consultation in Germany is even a matter of course when it is not 
required. Interests are regarded not as they are in the U.K. (as potential threats or 
potential vote-securers) but as legitimate and necessary representatives of 
constituencies.17 Federalism provides so many access points in the institutional structure 
for these interests that their influence is a foregone conclusion. Because of the 
decentralized decision-making process, the structure causes “the willingness and ability 
to cooperate” on the part of most actors, and in turn the progress of policy depends on 
this willingness. The political culture in Germany (a third-tier effect) results from the 
institutional structure and allows for its operation.  
The level of access provided to interest groups, while often viewed in a negative 
light, has a few positive ramifications. First, it provides the government with much-
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needed expertise in both policy innovation and administration. The interest groups serve 
as representatives for constituents that are often neglected due to the lack of 
accountability in the Bundestag (resulting from the nationally-determined balance of 
power inherent to the PR system). Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the fact 
that the federal government and the interest groups assume interest consultation means 
that the level of dialogue is raised. Interest groups do not need to use fiery rhetoric in 
order to gain traction among voters and thus attention from the government. Politicians 
are similarly discouraged from disparagement of interest groups as they are accepted as 
part of the process. Corporatism will incline towards inclusive policy-making in the area 
of pension retrenchment: the government is accustomed to cooperation, and in turn the 
interests are less likely to be uncompromising.18 With the added variable of interest 
consultation and accommodation, policy-makers in Germany face a very difficult task 
indeed. 
In terms of capability, then, it seems that Germany is on the opposite end of the 
continuum as the United Kingdom, in terms of both highest amount possible and 
variability between governments. More formally stated, there are far more veto points 
present in Germany, so much so that Germany is most certainly consensual rather than 
majoritarian in nature. As regards the first tier, Germany is not monolithic. While the 
Bundestag appoints the executive, a Bundesrat dominated by an opposing coalition may 
block the executive’s agenda, constituting a veto point. The discussion of the differences 
between FPTP and PR systems are similarly relevant to the determination of veto points: 
coalitions are understandably not cohesive, and as the parties forming the coalition are 
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not wedded to each other, small parties gain considerable influence and the ability to 
block policy.  
Bicameralism in Germany presents a veto point across branches of government, 
explained above, but also within the same branch. If the legislature is split, one house can 
stop the policy-making process. Federalism allows state governments veto power not 
only in the Bundesrat but also as a result of the power afforded them regarding 
implementation. This serves both as leverage in the initial shaping of legislation and 
power over actual execution of such legislation. Finally, pervasive formal and informal 
interest consultation constitutes a considerable veto point. As a matter of fact, in terms of 
veto points outlined by Bonoli, only one does not exist in Germany: the dual executive, 
because the President in Germany serves a mostly ceremonial role.  
This addresses the first factor in Weaver and Rockman’s capability determinants 
framework. It must be noted that while these veto points all nominally serve as points 
where legislation can be blocked by a suitable coalition of interests, in practice these veto 
points merely reinforce the political culture of cooperation and consensus instead of 
affecting efficiency of government. Nevertheless, they do have mitigating power over 
sweeping change. The second factor in their framework is cohesiveness of leadership, 
which can be categorized as low in a government focused on consensus. Despite the risks 
to parties associated with cooperation as opposed to confrontation, the German 
government is relatively insulated from short-term pressure. This results from a much 
lower concentration of accountability at the federal level: responsibility for legislation is 
understood to be distributed between all levels of government. Just as high amounts of 
capability are associated with a large amount of accountability, so is the opposite true. 
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Leadership in the Bundestag and thus the executive is relatively stable according to 
Schmidt, because of the difficulties passing a no-confidence vote, but the fact that the 
Bundesrat’s composition can shift at almost any time reduces the stability of legislative 
leadership.19 Finally, Weaver and Rockman characterize a high level of access for 
external interests as detrimental to capability, and the corporatist nature of Germany 
proves to be no exception.  
The German federal government is therefore relatively incapable, especially 
compared to the United Kingdom. Policy innovation is both aided and restricted by 
corporatism, priority setting is muddled due to the inclusion of even the opposition party 
in much decision-making, policy implementation is mostly left to the states resulting in a 
lack of control and assurance of implementation, and loss imposition is next to 
impossible because of incorporation of a large amount of actors with veto power. On the 
other hand, coordination of conflicting objectives is relatively successful, as a result of a 
consensual political culture and formal mechanisms of dispute resolution. In terms of 
pension policy, we are most concerned with policy innovation and especially loss 
imposition.  
Framed as a question of predictability of outcome, one may only speculate as to 
the speed and minor nature of policy rather than the effectiveness, as there are so many 
variables entering into the equation. The calculation of outcome is much more complex 
than in the United Kingdom, where a balance of accountability and power is often 
sufficient. As opposed to the United Kingdom, change in domestic policy in Germany is 
mostly “gradual and incremental… Dramatic changes in policy are the exception rather 
than the rule.”20 This tendency is especially worrisome given the current dire situation 
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that Germany finds itself in concerning pension funding. It is perhaps possible to 
conclude that meaningful policy change in Germany will occur gradually, even if a 
sufficient portion of the population and thus parties recognizes the dangers that 
demographic change poses to a pay-as-you-go system.  
 The generally low level of capability of German federal governments explains the 
2001 outcome. While governments have had the will to produce effective change for 
some time, and accountability is intrinsically low, the lack of capability hinders any 
significant attempts at retrenchment. It is no surprise that the 2001 reform, with some 
similar elements to the 1986 SSA reform, did not occur until fifteen years after the British 
reform. This lack of capability essentially renders the German government critically 
unresponsive to dire budgetary and demographic pressures, and the 2001 reform is no 
exception. While it did produce a measure of reform not previously seen, it was not 
sufficient. Furthermore, the government’s objectives were tempered by the necessary 
inclusion of the unions.  
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THE NECESSITY OF LOW-VISIBILITY REFORM 
 
 I have discussed accountability and capability, and explained how institutional 
design determines the level of these two factors. While these two factors are critical to an 
account of the variation of outcomes, especially across these two countries, it is necessary 
to include a third factor: the successful usage of low-visibility policies. This factor 
appears to be universal to democratic governments seeking to impose losses. I base that 
assertion on the fact that one may observe its necessity in political environments on both 
ends of the spectrum: in the U.K. at the height of capability, and in Germany in the 
depths of consensualism. It seems that this strategy is a sine qua non of pension 
retrenchment, and more broadly any loss imposition.  
 Low visibility policies are “policies that are designed in a technical manner in 
order to obfuscate the long-term implications of these policies… the ramifications of low-
visibility policies are often not obvious to the non-expert.”1 This type of policy is 
especially important to pension policy-makers: the incentives that governments face more 
generally to produce short-term benefits and avoid long-term benefits that cannot be 
immediately credited (or can be credited to future governments) are amplified by the 
‘long tail’ of pension programs. Therefore, governments seek to ‘fix’ pension programs 
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not through measures with instant impact but rather through subtle tweaks that have little 
immediate impact but significant aggregating effects over time.2 This ability is a boon for 
policy-makers, because the ability to produce significant retrenchment with seemingly 
minor tweaks corresponds with the need to impose losses surreptitiously.  
 Despite my assertion that low-visibility policies are universally necessary to 
effective retrenchment, I maintain that beyond the requirements of the nature of loss 
imposition, these policies are necessary for different reasons in the U.K. and Germany.  
Low-visibility retrenchment must be characterized in the British model especially as a 
method to limit accountability. The institutional effects present in the U.K. establish the 
dichotomy between capability and accountability, and low-visibility retrenchment is a 
critical strategy that governments use to limit accountability. On the other hand, in 
Germany low-visibility policies enhance capability. As explored above, the German 
system tends to produce results incrementally, over a long time horizon. Low-visibility 
strategies are precisely the type of strategy that German policy-makers will seek to 
employ, because grand, sweeping change is nearly impossible. Subtle, technical tweaks, 
on the other hand, have the potential to change outcomes without immediate opposition. 
Effectively, this strategy provides capabilities not previously available to the consensual 
German government. Busemeyer notes that the existence of powerful veto points 
encourages such low-visibility change.3 
What should we expect about prevalence of low-visibility strategies in the United 
Kingdom? The model predicts a duality of expected outcome. One would expect to see 
this type of low-visibility retrenchment during periods where power is counter-balanced 
by a high level of accountability. For example, if a majority is particularly narrow, or if 
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an election is imminent, this type of tweak would be expected. This effect is amplified by 
the party culture in the U.K. Waltz explains the reasoning behind this: “a party is never 
monolithic… [It is] the requisite art for a Prime Minister… to manage the party in ways 
that avoid the defiance of the many or the rebellion of the few, if those few are 
important.”4 Thus the government cannot “be too far in front of, or to the side of, [its] 
party,” and a party that is primarily concerned with securing “the continuity and health of 
the organization itself,” or staying in power, will oppose high-visibility policies like 
immediate benefit reduction.56 As an aside, one must keep in mind that existing policies 
must allow for low-visibility loss imposition; this speaks to path dependency.7  
The second factor accounting for low-visibility policy outcomes in the U.K. 
concerns ideology of the general public (as opposed to party ideology). There is scant 
evidence showing that the British are deeply alarmed about their level of pension 
provision. While perhaps at odds with the fact that “75 percent of the elderly would have 
incomes less than 40 percent of national average earnings,” the British Social Attitudes 
Survey has revealed that “education and health, rather than social security, tend be the 
first priorities of most surveyed individuals.”89 So while an empirical analysis concludes 
that provision is lacking, the British public generally do not find it to be a primary 
concern. This has two opposing implications for policy-makers: first, retrenchment 
should encounter little resistance especially if it frees up funds for higher-priority areas of 
social expenditure. Yet the fact remains that if the public does not see pension provision 
as a pressing issue, it may be difficult to marshal support. Why should governments 
impose losses when it can only have negative political consequences? If there is no public 
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demand for pension retrenchment, it seems likely that policy-makers will choose low-
visibility options with a wary eye on the horizon. 
As with the United Kingdom, we are now prepared to produce expectations about 
the strategies that Germany will tend to employ. Busemeyer provides an enlightening 
model to use while examining the German case, and countries with many veto points in 
general. He notes that there is a concrete difference between what he refers to as 
quantitative retrenchment (benefit reduction, etc.) and system change (characterized by 
changes in the method of provision and the underlying logic of the system).10 
Furthermore, he contends that the German model tends to produce system change rather 
than quantitative retrenchment. In either case, however, low-visibility policies are 
essential to success, as the number of veto players ensures that any policy will encounter 
powerful opposition.  
Without even delving into specific examples, we are able to create predictions 
regarding the strategies of policy-makers in both the U.K. and Germany based upon the 
channeling effects of institutions. Each case, however, produces different strategies that 
rely on the framework. In the U.K., usage of low-visibility strategies varies based on the 
level of accountability, and generally serves as a measure to reduce accountability. 
Therefore, it is the institutional dichotomy produced in a majoritarian system that directs 
strategy. Furthermore, the importance of accountability in the U.K. emphasizes 
governmental competence. In Germany, strategy reflects the particular level of capability 
of a government instead of accountability. This in turn is based upon the dynamics of the 
first and second-tier effects, including divided government and level of majority.  
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While low-visibility strategies are used in both countries, this is a reflection of the 
politics of accountability in the U.K. and of low capability in Germany. It seems that if 
one accounts for these factors, the explanatory power of the model is quite strong. 
Finally, while it is apparent from a theoretical perspective which strategies will be most 
effective, whether or not a government ultimately chooses to implement them can be a 
function of the competence of the government.  
It is my contention, therefore, that after due consideration of will and capability is 
made, the competence and awareness that a government demonstrates by implementing 
low-visibility policies helps to determine the outcome of a reform attempt. With an 
explanatory model in place, I am able to assess whether the 1986 and 2001 reforms 
support this conclusion. 
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THE REFORMS AND THE MODEL 
 
 Let us examine how these three factors (will, capability, and skillful 
implementation of low-visibility strategies) work to produce outcomes, using the cases of 
the 1986 SSA and the 2001 Riester Reform. The prevalence of low-visibility policies 
displayed during these reforms by the respective governments depends on the situation: 
this involves the actual scenario as well as the relation of the government to the 
framework at the time regarding the various variables introduced. Despite this situational 
nature, the lessons imparted by the examples are informative more generally, in addition 
to informing the opportunity/risk theme. They also serve as excellent examples of the 
ways that execution can affect outcomes.  
 The 1986 reform demonstrates the accuracy of the general predictions regarding 
optimal strategies in the U.K. As previously explained, Thatcher’s Conservative 
government was committed to reducing state spending, due in large part to the Hayekian 
ideology espoused by Thatcher and Reagan (and of course the electoral mandate it 
received).1 In 1984, Social Services Secretary Norman Fowler produced a report intended 
to examine and reform the social security system.2 Note that the timing mattered: it was 
released after the 1983 election, when accountability was low. Fowler advocated the 
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eventual and gradual elimination of SERPS. This suggestion was met with a high level of 
opposition, by the media, trade groups, and of course Labour, who promised to reverse 
any major modifications of SERPS.3 Eventually, the Conservatives relented, and released 
an improved plan for reform, in the form of the White Paper of December 1985.   
 What lessons are to be learned from this seeming blunder by the Conservatives? 
First, it is likely that had the Conservatives been bent on this reform, they could have 
produced the intended reform despite the outcry. The power afforded the government in 
the U.K. is too overwhelming. That said, despite the fact that accountability should have 
been low due to the timing of the proposal, Labour’s threat to reverse any major 
modifications highlights the problems that institutional effects pose to policy 
maintenance in the U.K. It is highly unlikely that the Conservatives would undertake this 
reform with the expectation that it would be reversed in an embarrassing fashion. 
Furthermore, the Conservatives failed to initially take into account an insurmountable 
path dependency issue. Eliminating SERPS would have produced the problem of double-
payment, because the current generation of workers would have had to continue to 
finance retirees while supporting their own private schemes.4 Taking this into 
consideration, the failure to implement this policy is less a referendum on the power of 
the majoritarian system than the ineptitude of the Conservative government. 
Governments with strong capabilities are more able to overcome path dependence “due to 
the political difficulties involved in shifting away from established structural equilibria,” 
but they cannot overcome path dependency rooted in the double payment program.5 
Thus, path dependency has limiting effects even on majoritarian governments. This case 
highlights the complex nature of capability. 
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 In place of the doomed plan to reform SERPS, the Conservatives implemented a 
reform strategy far more in line with expectations provided by path dependency and 
accountability reduction. This strategy was met with much less opposition and is 
generally regarded to be a long-term success, as explained earlier. This reform 
“minimized the number of immediate losers,” including employers and the Treasury, by 
limiting the short-term losses suffered.6 These immediate losers must have obviously 
represented significant threats in terms of accountability to the Conservative government, 
or they would have simply been ignored. Moreover, the retrenchment produced by the 
reform has been described as having “greatly lowered visibility.”7 By framing the reform 
as an amendment instead of elimination, and by making the changes highly technical in 
nature, the Conservative government employed a low-visibility strategy while producing 
significant results. In general, this example serves as a demonstration of “the Thatcher 
government’s significant capacity to impose losses on current and future pensioners.”8 
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, it emphasizes the role of low-visibility even 
within the relatively relaxed institutional constraints in a majoritarian nation.  
I would argue that, despite some inept blunders, the Conservatives displayed a 
high level of political acumen. The final 1986 SSA, and its effectiveness at derailing 
substantial accountability gains, confirms this conclusion. The blunders, and subsequent 
skillful tweaking of objectives, serves as a fine example of the opportunities that a 
majoritarian government, with low accountability and high power concentration, 
experiences with regards to policy-making. Inept blunders such as the initial Green Paper 
eliminating SERPS might have proved fatal to government in a weaker position, but the 
Conservatives were afforded a second chance. Therefore, while competence produces 
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superior results, it provides more opportunities than risks to a government in this 
position, and thus more freedom regarding policy innovation. This may help to explain 
why the Conservatives attempted reform at all during such a relatively unstressed period: 
the perils of failure were not sufficient to preclude experimentation, and as a result a 
favorable outcome was produced.  
When one considers that the will to reform was provided by ideology and the 
expectation of mild future pressures, and that the level of accountability was extremely 
low, it is no surprise that the Conservatives embarked upon such a comprehensive 
reform. The model then turns to capability, and the majoritarian environment provided a 
wealth of that. In fact, if one considers the extreme level of capability present at the time, 
one may wonder why the reform was not even more comprehensive and substantial. The 
answer to that, of course, is that some accountability remained, especially as the British 
population hardly considered such reform pressing. Therefore, high-visibility policies 
such as abandoning SERPS altogether were dismissed as unnecessarily risky, and the 
pragmatic nature of the Thatcherites led to low-visibility policies. While these were not 
strictly necessary in the majoritarian environment, any competent government in a similar 
position will seek to minimize any potential loss of political capital through similar 
design. 
The 2001 Riester Reform is a prime example of Busemeyer’s conception of a 
systems change strategy. It also demonstrates the expectations of the likely strategies to 
be used in Germany. This reform included a number of low-visibility policies. These 
include the subtle accentuation of occupational pensions over personal savings and 
changes to the pension adjustment formula allowing for government ‘tinkering.’9 In 
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addition, there is no mention of straightforward ‘benefit reduction.’10 The literature 
describes this reform as a system change rather than a quantitative reduction. 
Specifically, it is conceptualized as a shift from a defined benefit system to a defined 
contribution system, with “very limited reductions in spending, but a… change towards a 
system where the private sector plays a larger role than before.”11 Strategies in Germany 
will reflect the institutional effects present and focus on low-visibility system change 
rather than quantitative retrenchment. Whether this is a fundamental ideological shift or a 
strategic requirement is a possible area of study for future scholars.  
While the majoritarian system in the U.K. mostly precludes the need to strategize 
‘across the aisle,’ German policy-makers are forced to build coalitions and take the 
opposition’s needs into account. Busemeyer explains that there are two general ways in 
which they do this, especially when governments are constrained by a divided 
government (such as the opposition maintaining control of the Bundesrat). He calls the 
first strategy the “Grand Coalition strategy,” and this entails “a formal or informal 
project-bound coalition between the two major parties.”12 The institutional effects 
encourage this process, and in fact had been the dominant strategy for pension reform 
until 2001.13 However, it presents some problems for policy-makers. The nature of the 
consensual system means that each actor in the government represents a veto point, as 
they must consent to allow the government to act collectively.14 The problem arises upon 
consideration of the motivation of the opposition, who do not share the interest of 
keeping the government in power.15 This gives rise to fierce political competition and 
frequent concession.16 Moreover, the coalition must be strong enough to represent 
significant bargaining power with external interests interested in shaping pension 
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policy.17 The government also faces an opposition with no incentive to cooperate if 
desired policies are functionally similar to the government; the opposition has no interest 
in allowing the government the coup of a major reform. At the same time, the similar 
policy desires of the opposition produce a pronounced lack of bargaining power and 
influence.18 This was the case in 2001, and the strategy of the Social Democrats (who had 
a majority in the Bundestag) reflected the problems with the Grand Coalition strategy.  
The 2001 reform was not a result of this Grand Coalition strategy, but rather of 
what is referred to as ‘experimental law-making.’19 Busemeyer defines this as “’a 
relatively unprepared and unplanned style’ of decision-making which systematically 
involved ‘situational and ad hoc consensus-building.’”20 The specific circumstances and 
the “institutionally weak” government dictated the use of this strategy in the case of the 
2001 reform.21 One example of this strategy was demonstrated in the Social Democrats’ 
attempt to use the unions as a coalition partner when the opposition failed to cooperate.22 
This naturally had a mitigating effect on the reductions included in the final bill, but it 
made passage possible in the first place. The existence of these two strategies constitute 
confirmation of the previous conclusion that coalition building is the precondition to 
policy change in Germany; “a unilateral strategy of pushing through with reforms is not 
possible.”23 
The Social Democrats had the will to reform; it has been clear for decades that the 
German pension system faces significant pressures. Furthermore, Schröder was hoping 
for the electoral boost that accompanied reform success, or even the appearance of reform 
success. The fact that the appearance of success was of overriding importance shaped the 
final appearance of the bill: Schröder’s government was concerned above all with 
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passage of the bill as opposed to the inclusion of significant and pragmatic reform. While 
it is true that the government’s accountability was increased upon non-inclusion of the 
opposition party during the construction and passage of the bill, the low-visibility policies 
were likely necessitated by capability, or lack thereof. Schröder’s capability was reduced 
by the same non-inclusion of the Christian Democrats, because he was forced to marshal 
sufficient external support. Therefore, the strategies that the reform employed to retrench 
were low-visibility so as to avoid significant external opposition. However, I concede that 
an increased level of accountability due to the lack of cooperation with the opposition 
party likely played a role in convincing Riester and company to limit high-visibility 
cutbacks. The reform thus serves to show how will and capability shape reform, but also 
how low-visibility strategies are critical to even modest success. 
Furthermore, due to the incremental nature of change, and the frequency of low-
accountability and low-power environments, skillful execution more generally has a 
limited affect on policy outcomes in Germany. Choosing to enact high-visibility policies 
is simply not an option, whereas in the U.K. the possibility remains that an either 
incompetent or extremely capable government could conceivably attempt high-visibility 
retrenchment. However, the current circumstances suggest that the nature of reform in 
both countries will continue to employ low-visibility strategies, despite their vastly 
differing levels of capability and accountability. While these two factors help us predict 
the extent to which low-visibility strategies will be used, we may be confident in 
assuming that they will remain universally relevant to pension retrenchment efforts in 
democracies.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
“From attributes one cannot predict outcomes if outcomes depend on the 
situations of the actors as well as on their attributes.”1 Waltz’ point about systems theory 
describes the difficulty that scholars encounter the world over in trying to explain 
different pension retrenchment outcomes. It is not merely enough to examine the specific 
legislation that the U.K. and Germany have passed; as political scientists we seek the 
reasons behind outcomes when constructing theory. The differences in policy outcomes 
in the United Kingdom and Germany may seem expected. While they are both 
parliamentary democracies with an aging population, they are opposing archetypes of 
pension provision. One has a majoritarian system, the other a consensual system. One is 
relatively insulated from external interests, while the other institutionalizes them due to 
its corporatist nature. Yet examination and careful study shows that contrasting these two 
cases allows for significant insight into the factors affecting policy outcomes.  
 An interesting feature of pension retrenchment efforts is that they are very similar 
to other types of retrenchment attempted by policy-makers the world over. For instance, 
while it is true that pension programs are especially universal in nature, and exhibit 
consequences with a ‘long tail,’ attempts to reduce health-care costs, food stamps, 
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unemployment benefits, military base closures, and farm subsidies are all plagued by 
some of the same problems that face pension policy-makers. Differences between intent 
and outcomes in these areas are often attributable to the presence of a large number of 
veto points, a high-visibility nature, negativity biases, or path dependency. In short, while 
pension programs do provide unique challenges to policy-makers, they also provide 
challenges familiar to any government attempting retrenchment in almost any policy area. 
As a result, comparison of successful and unsuccessful cases of pension program 
retrenchment imparts insight into how democracies can achieve success in these areas. 
More generally, it is enlightening as to the inherent failures of democracies.  
 Loss imposition is never easy for any type of government. However, it is easier 
for some than others. I have sought to frame capability as a balance between power and 
accountability, and hypothesized that these are mainly determined by institutional design. 
Against a background of declining state revenue and GDP, this capability becomes 
critically important. Basic intuition would suggest that secure authoritarian governments 
are able to impose losses easier even than majoritarian governments, but this hypothesis 
is something for future scholars to investigate.  
 The nature of democracy causes these difficulties, and institutional design can 
serve to exacerbate or to mitigate. Voters are predisposed against reducing their own 
benefits; indeed, it is human nature to find self-limitation problematic. Many voters find 
it hard to prioritize the welfare of future generations over their own. This is compounded 
in democracies by the fact that the constituencies of programs usually have more to lose 
relative to how much taxpayers will save, and the differing volume of protest by either 
group reflects this. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, politicians are essentially 
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elected on the basis of popularity, perceptions of competence, and their history of voting 
for popular initiatives rather than actual effectiveness. Elected officials will only 
propagate unpopular policies (and retrenchment always falls into that category) if their 
estimate of future benefit to their reputation outweighs the instant cost, and those who do 
otherwise do so at their own peril. These types of policies are therefore low priorities, as 
the imperatives are usually exogenous rather than given by the people. Elected officials 
are myopic mostly as a result of institutional design, while voters are simply intrinsically 
myopic.  
 Even democracies able to achieve high levels of capability like the United 
Kingdom have difficulties imposing losses: even the Thatcherites were forced to shift 
towards low-visibility policies. Consensual democracies with little capability like 
Germany find low-visibility policies to be a sine qua non of retrenchment, and even these 
strategies may not be enough to impose the losses necessary to forestall disaster. This 
makes the situation for these countries both troublesome and expected. It is to be 
expected, following examination of the model, that each country finds itself in its current 
position. The original quandary of the United Kingdom having solved its pension woes is 
no longer puzzling, and Germany’s problems might have easily been foreseen. 
Low-visibility policies are not always the efficient solution from an economic 
standpoint, but this disjuncture is fundamental to the relationship between economics and 
political science. Economists seek to discover the pareto-efficient solution, while political 
scientists and politicians seek to apply the most efficient solution possible (as described 
by economists) within the institutional framework. In any case, I find that policy-makers, 
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especially in the area of pension programs, in any democracy would do well to include as 
many low-visibility policies in their retrenchment efforts as possible.  
These conclusions place extreme importance on the past and future institutional 
design of democracies; in short, institutions matter. Those involved in the redesign or 
genesis of democratic institutions would do well to keep the lessons of retrenchment in 
mind, especially when considering the number of veto points they create. However, I 
must concede that loss imposition, while of critical importance, is not the sole 
determinant of the success of a state, and as such it must be balanced against other duties 
that government is responsible for.  
 What does the future hold for the pension programs in these countries? Despite 
the volatility introduced by the global financial crisis, I believe my model is enlightening 
as to probable future approaches. I believe that governments will not find the will to 
reform lacking due to the extreme nature of the crisis, and the people in these two 
countries will be more likely to accept that change is required in this setting. Therefore, 
ideology and path dependence will likely be less relevant to this discussion. 
I expect the revisions of estimates of the funding situation in the U.K. in 2040 to 
show a less rosy picture. As such, I do expect future retrenchment efforts. One should 
focus on the relative levels of power and accountability of the current government. These 
tell us what the magnitude and character of the strategy are likely to be: high or low 
visibility, quantitative retrenchment, or system change. However, the competence of a 
government vis-à-vis strategy will determine capability to an extent. It is probable that 
future problems will be anticipated rather rapidly; in the past, the U.K. has demonstrated 
the ability to alter policy before matters spiral out of control. Their current situation 
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reflects this ability, as do the preemptive reforms undertaken in the past 25 years. Finally, 
these policy alterations will likely be large and sweeping in nature, and will materialize 
relatively rapidly, due to the majoritarian system.  
In Germany, the power/accountability level is relatively fixed. This creates 
uncertainty regarding outcomes, because power and accountability are relatively simple 
to calculate. Since Germany has low levels of capability, decentralized decision-making, 
and thus decentralized accountability, other effects are critical to prediction of policy 
outcomes. Strategy, ideology, and path dependence hold particular relevance. Recently, 
as described by Busemeyer, ideology has shifted slightly, partly in response to the need 
for low-visibility retrenchment. We should expect a shift away from a defined benefit 
system, but with the condition that the historical notion of social insurance be unharmed. 
Path dependent arguments in Germany focus on the power of external interests, because 
these interests are constituencies dependent on pension provision. The nature of the 
consensual and corporatist system dictates that any change will be incremental and not 
substantially quantitative. The political strategy chosen by the government is dictated by 
the particular balance of power, and the policy-making strategy taken is determined by 
the political strategy. The choice of a Grand Coalition strategy or an experimental law-
making strategy in turn determines which actors have veto power. Therefore, level of 
uncertainty regarding outcomes is thus relatively high in Germany, and is highly 
dependent on particular situations. It is clear, though, that the global financial crisis will 
create a substantial imperative to retrench even further, and I would expect large-scale 
reform efforts as soon as more short-term issues have been addressed.  
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I briefly mentioned the current global financial calamity. This thesis was written 
as the global financial meltdown unfolded. Whether or not the scope of my discussion is 
sufficiently insulated to retain relevancy, I am unable to determine. However, the crisis 
the world faces does pose some interesting questions in the area of pension retrenchment. 
After all, there are few institutional investors as large as pension systems, and they are 
among the hardest hit. At a general level, we should expect redoubled efforts in this area, 
with majoritarian governments like the U.K. doing this faster and more capably than 
Germany. It would be interesting to witness whether the coalition-building nature of 
Germany actually proves to be beneficial: perhaps the tendency towards coalition will 
enhance the likelihood of a unified response, similar to what occurred in the U.K. during 
World War II.  
If this crisis necessitates a radical upheaval of each system, it will be quite 
difficult to predict what direction they will take, but I hope that the framework I have 
provided herein is somewhat helpful. Also, in the case of radical upheaval, the capability 
to respond to massive structural shocks will prove to be a gold mine to future scholars in 
making concrete assessments of these governments. It might be interesting to note 
whether ideology or pragmatism plays a larger role: will Germany steadfastly refuse to 
move away from social insurance? Will the U.K. reduce state-provided benefits to an 
even more bare universal level? Or will each country seek policies that provide the most 
pragmatic solutions? These are trying times, and there is no shining example to emulate 
in this area. But in a way, it may prove to be the best test of my theoretical model, and I 
look forward to developments. 
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